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Polling can influence public opinion—polls convey normative information people are motivated 
to follow. Polls are often presented as reflecting the larger population (superordinate group)—
frequently representing high-status subgroups. Marginalized groups are treated as exceptions to 
the norm in need of explanation. The current work examines if low-status subgroup members 
perceive their group as represented in national polls and the consequences of perceived 
representation for following superordinate group norms (bandwagoning). I expected: 1) Low-
status subgroup members would identify with the superordinate group less than high-status 
subgroup members, 2) Low-status subgroup members would perceive less subgroup 
representation in national polls than high-status subgroup members, 3) Low-status subgroup 
members would be less likely than high-status subgroup members to bandwagon, 4) Norm 
adherence would depend on perceived representation and identification, with low-status 
subgroup members bandwagoning less than high-status subgroups members to the extent they 
see their group as underrepresented and less identified with the superordinate group, and 5) 
Subgroups would be less likely to bandwagon when the issue was relevant to the group’s 
interests. Participants viewed a national poll in which the majority of respondents either 
supported or opposed a position (Studies 1-2). Participants rated support for the issue and 
perception of racial groups’ representation in the poll. In Study 3, participants viewed a similar 
poll, but viewed poll sample gender composition information—either women or men were a 
majority of respondents. In all studies, low-status (vs. high-status) subgroup members had equal 
(Studies 1-3) or higher (Study 2A) national identification. Participants viewed low-status 
subgroup members as less represented than high-status subgroups (Studies 1-2) or perceived 




studies. Counter to expectations, low-status subgroup members bandwagoned equally to or more 
than high-status subgroups members (Studies 1-3; but see exceptions Study 2A/B). Perceived 
subgroup representation did not reliably influence bandwagoning (Studies 1-3). In Study 3, 
women were more likely to bandwagon and perceived relevance decreased bandwagoning 
compared to men for a less gender-relevant issue. Results offered mixed support for 
hypotheses—subgroup representation did not reliably predict bandwagoning, but relevance may 
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Social Influence in Superordinate Groups and Subgroups 
Black voters face a series of conundrums when voicing policy positions and 
choosing candidates. […] The policy preferences and desires of the black 
community are rarely reflected in national and state laws, with an inverse 
relationship between black support and a law’s chance of passage. (That’s true for 
Latinos and women as well.) 
- Farai Chideya, FiveThirtyEight 
 Polling information helps inform politicians and the public about public opinion and 
potential election outcomes. Polls do not merely reflect historical trends and changes in 
attitudes—they can affect future attitudes. Social information is conveyed through polls people 
use implicitly or explicitly in forming attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Simon, 1954; Ansolabehere 
& Iyengar, 1994). People are motivated to follow attitudes and behaviors of important groups to 
gain approval, gain information, help the group, or compare and distinguish themselves from 
others (e.g. Brewer, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). But polls often 
express attitudes as an aggregate of a large, superordinate group. Superordinate groups, 
especially in terms of national identity, tend to reflect large and/or powerful demographic groups 
(e.g., White Americans, men; e.g., Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2010; Van Berkel, 
Molina, & Mukherjee, 2016). Reports of polls describe the attitudes of minority groups often as 
the group that needs explanation—the exception to the “normative” superordinate group (e.g., 
the Black vote, the Latino vote, the Women’s vote; e.g., Kurtzleben, 2016; Silver, 2016; Troy, 
2016). The current work examines the extent to which low-status subgroup members perceived 
their group as represented in national polls and the consequences of this perceived representation 
for following the social norms of the superordinate, national group. I expect members of 
minority groups will view their group as less represented in a poll of superordinate group 
attitudes because they are less represented in the national identity and will be influenced by this 





 Polling information gives voters electoral advantages by allowing them to vote 
strategically—they can make decisions based on chance of success (Simon, 1954; Mutz, 1995). 
Polling also influences voters by providing normative information. People are more likely to vote 
for a candidate or policy that is leading the polls or has normative support—a position that is 
expected to win based on published poll data—a phenomenon referred to as bandwagoning (e.g., 
Fleitas, 1971; Hennessy, 1970; Nadeau, Cloutier, & Guay, 1993; Simon, 1954). When people 
saw polls that Bill Clinton led Bush by 17 points (but not 5 points) in the 1992 election, they 
preferred Clinton compared to no poll information (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994). The same 
pattern of results appeared when people saw information about leads in Senate and mayoral 
races—candidates leading polls were more likely to gain voter support. Poll information did not 
affect intended voter turnout. Bandwagon effects tend to be small and do not cause people to 
radically change behavior (e.g., intending to vote when they might not otherwise). Polls reliably 
shift voters toward the dominant opinion in small, but important ways. 
 Bandwagon effects extend beyond voting behaviors to include personal opinions. As 
Marsh (1984) explains, bandwagoning simply refers to the phenomenon whereby information 
about a majority opinion causes people to adopt the majority opinion. Polls influenced support 
for abortion and the sovereignty of Quebec by five to seven percent (Nadeau et al., 1993). 
Perceptions of collective opinion, but not personal opinions, changed after exposure to polling 
information and were sustained over time (Sonck & Loosveldt, 2010). However, Sonck and 
Loosveldt provided partial poll information (e.g., the percent of people that thought Flanders 
should be independent, but not the percent of people that thought it should not be independent). 




for issues with weaker predispositions (Rothschild & Malhotra, 2014). Bandwagoning partially 
depends on prior attitudes—polls are unlikely to change crystallized attitudes, but can reliably 
sway a voter either on the fence or with limited knowledge. 
Bandwagon effects have led to concerns about reporting of early election results. Exit 
polls and early media projections of voting results may discourage people from voting who have 
not yet made it to polls (Jackson, 1983). The dissemination of early election results and polls 
could influence election outcomes—people will follow the actions of others and vote for a 
leading candidate (Skalaban, 1988). Polls, like voting, give citizens a chance to express opinions 
or react to politicians’ actions (Moy & Rinke, 2012). Polls both bias citizens’ opinions and allow 
citizens to influence politicians. Good polls use representative population samples, but 
numerically dominant groups still compose a poll majority. Polls may bias attitudes towards the 
position of the numerical majority and only allow the majority to express an opinion or reaction. 
One reason people may support a leading candidate or position is to gain positive self-
esteem from identifying with a winner—basking in reflected glory (BIRGing; Cialdini, Borden, 
Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976). People displayed signs for a winning candidate 
compared to a losing candidate longer after an election (Miller, 2009). In a complementary 
phenomenon, cutting off reflected failure (CORFing), people are more likely to distance 
themselves from a group when the group fails. Distancing includes avoiding group participation 
and avoiding symbols of group identification (Snyder, Lassegar, & Ford, 1986). People were 
more likely to distance themselves from a losing candidate when self-esteem was low (Miller, 
2009). BIRGing and CORFing may partially explain individual motivations and consequences of 
bandwagoning—people gain self-esteem or avoid self-esteem loss by associating with winners 




associated with a winning group, candidate, or policy. Important social groups and identities also 
shape how social information is processed and used. 
Social Norms and Influence 
People define themselves, in part, through the groups to which they do and do not belong. 
Once people have been categorized, they are perceived in terms of their group and prototypes of 
their group (Turner et al., 1987). This process extends to the self (e.g., self-stereotyping). People 
assimilate themselves to a salient self-defining group, especially when the group is a numerical 
minority (Simon & Hamilton, 1994). Perceived similarity is both a cause and a consequence of 
group membership (Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995; Turner et al., 1987). Groups 
contribute to forming an identity and to shaping attitudes, values, and behaviors. 
People use social information, including group opinions, to help form opinions and 
attitudes. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished among normative and informational social 
influence. Normative influence is conformity to gain acceptance and positive evaluations from 
other people. Informational social influence is gaining information from others’ attitudes or 
behaviors—people adjust attitudes to be closer to others’ because others presumably provide 
evidence about reality. In bandwagoning, polling information may shift opinion toward a 
majority candidate because people want approval or because people assume the majority has 
information they do not. Normative influence assumes people feel social disapproval if they do 
not support the majority candidate or policy. Informational social influence is more likely if 
someone does not have strong prior opinion on the candidates or policies. The distinction 
between information and normative influences has largely been rejected by self-categorization 
researchers. Turner and colleagues (1987) argue information is only valid if it is perceived as 




work together to influence attitudes. Poll information tells voters about the attitudes held by most 
group members and which are most socially approved. Information is valid and persuasive to the 
extent it is shared and stereotypically associated with an ingroup (Turner et al., 1987). 
Informational influence depends on the importance of the group to the self—people trust the 
version of reality presented by an important ingroup rather than an outgroup. 
Researchers also distinguish between injunctive and descriptive norms. Descriptive 
norms motivate behavioral or attitudinal change through information about others’ attitudes and 
behaviors—they characterize what most people do (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). 
Injunctive norms change attitudes or behavior by providing information about what people 
should do. Bandwagoning and polling research largely focuses on descriptive norms—
information about others’ existing attitudes, but not about the injunctive standards. In general, 
the more people perform a behavior, the more likely others will be influenced to conform to the 
behavior (Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). In Asch’s (1952) studies of conformity, 
people were more likely to make errors matching lines based on length when the majority made 
identical errors. Social norms have the power to unintentionally increase negative behaviors if 
people perceive they are surpassing the group standard for behavior (e.g., save more energy than 
average; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). This boomerang effect is 
eliminated when descriptive norms are combined with injunctive norms because injunctive 
norms can indicate an extreme behavior is still approved of by the group. 
Injunctive norms have been implicitly connected to bandwagoning in Noelle-Neumann’s 
(1974) spiral of silence theory. This theory suggests one’s fear of isolation and rejection by the 
group leads them to either support majority opinions or to remain silent in dissent. Perceptions of 




up, while those who dissent remain quiet. The perceived majority grows and strengthens as a 
dominant position while the minority declines. The more one believes others hold an opinion, the 
more willing they are to express similar opinions (Glyn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997). People 
follow the norms they perceive, even if these norms are inaccurate, and fail to express normative 
opinions if they are perceived as deviant (Prentice & Miller, 1993). People are encouraged to 
express their opinion if it is approved by the group and to stifle their opinion if it is 
disapproved—which strengths the perceived norm of the attitude or behavior. Bandwagon effects 
largely focus on descriptive norms—polls mostly describe the group—but can influence 
perceptions of group values indirectly. 
Social Norms, Influence, and Similarity to the Group 
Even if people perceive a normative opinion, there are individual differences in the extent 
to which people follow the majority. The degree of influence by social information from a group 
partially depends on group identification. People adhere to the descriptive norms of a group 
central to self-concept or social identity but not to behaviorally irrelevant reference groups 
(Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). Group norms are only influential if people 
are part of the normative ingroup (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990). 
Abrams and colleagues used Sherif’s (1936) autokinetic effect paradigm to demonstrate that 
people were less influenced by a confederate when the confederate belonged to another group. In 
Abrams and colleagues extension of Asch’s (1956) conformity study, people were more likely to 
conform to an ingroup member, especially when responses were public, rather than private. 
Finally, people divided into groups were less likely to have converging attitudes when it was 
salient that groups were categorized based on their opinions versus uncategorized (randomly 




even if the group is arbitrarily or recently formed. 
Adherence to social norms of an ingroup extends to applications in marketing and policy 
and not just to judgments about lines and light in the lab. When consumers were primed with 
racial or ethnic identity, they responded more favorably to an ad with same-race compared to 
different-race actors (Forehand & Deshpandé, 2001; Forehand, Deshpandé, & Reed, 2002). 
People are likely to support a social policy when their political party supports it—even if it 
contradicts ideological beliefs (Cohen, 2003). Adherence to social norms does not just depending 
on being a member of a group—but also depends on the group’s importance or centrality to the 
self. People with strong compared to weak ethnic identification were more likely to buy brands 
advertised to their racial/ethnic group (Deshpandé, Hoyer, & Donthu, 1986). People are more 
likely to be influenced by ingroup members—especially when they are highly identified. 
 However, research has shown people follow the social norms of a setting and situation—
provincial norms—even when the group is irrelevant to identity (Goldstein, Cialdini, & 
Griskevicius, 2008). People were more likely to reuse hotel towels when told most past guests in 
the room compared to other important reference groups (i.e., citizens, men/women) reused 
towels. People were most likely to conform to the social group least important to identity, but 
most relevant to location. Meaningful social identities can be created through seemingly 
irrelevant similarities (e.g., hotel room number), as in the minimal group paradigm (Heider, 
1958; Tajfel, 1970). Social norms are followed most when they are perceived as situationally 
relevant—whether it is similarity to the group performing behavior or presence in a location in 
which the norms were formed. Polling information may influence voting behavior less than 
reports of actual voting, but important groups are likely to affect attitudes and behaviors. 




 Elaboration Likelihood Model. Accounts of persuasion take one’s context and mental 
state into consideration when predicting how an individual will react to attitude cues. The 
Elaboration-Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) argues there are 
two paths to persuasion, or attitude change: the central route and the peripheral route. Attitude 
change occurs through the central route when people carefully consider information and 
arguments presented. The peripheral route occur when attitude change results from reliance on 
simple cues—information presented is not carefully scrutinized. As cognitive response theory 
suggests, persuasion does not come from the message itself, but from one’s cognitive response to 
the message (Greenwald, 1968). The ELM assumes people are motivated to hold attitudes that 
accurately reflect the state of the world (Festinger, 1954). When people are motivated and able to 
process arguments, they are more likely to use the central route. As this motivation and ability 
decreases, the peripheral route and the importance of peripheral cues increases.  
  Heuristic-Systematic Model. The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980; 
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) and the ELM are similar models, developed concurrently. 
Like the ELM, the HSM argues there are two paths to persuasion. Systematic processing, like the 
central route, is detailed, analytic processing of message content. Heuristic processing, like the 
peripheral route, is relatively effortless processing—people exert little effort in judging the 
validity of the message, but rely on cues unrelated to message content to form an attitude or 
opinion. The ELM and HSM argue that systematic/central and heuristic/peripheral processing 
can occur simultaneously—the two forms of processing exert additive or independent effects 
(e.g. Petty, 1994). The HSM is narrower than the ELM in defining the two routes(Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993).. The peripheral route refers to any cognitive or affective process that affects 




rules that mediate persuasion, or attitude formation. Heuristic processing is viewed as one type of 
peripheral processing in the ELM (Petty, 1994). Eagly and Chaiken (1993) also point out that 
heuristic processes will not be applied in attitude judgments unless salient and accessible.  
Like the ELM, the HSM assumes people are motivated to have accurate attitudes (Eagly 
& Chaiken, 1993). However, the HSM allows for other motivations, including impression 
motivation—the desire to hold socially accepted attitudes (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). Impression-
relevant motivations are active when social relationships are salient, or when people are expected 
to explain their attitudes to others (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). Impression motivation can occur 
under heuristic or systematic processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Impression motivation is 
particularly relevant to issues that invoke social identity (as with subgroups and superordinate 
groups) because people are motivated to follow the group and to avoid social sanctions from the 
group when they deviate. The HSM, like the ELM, leaves the processes through which social 
pressure influences persuasion dependent on the context in which it occurs. 
Attitude Change versus Attitude Formation. Although persuasion research mostly 
considers attitude change, it can be applied in the context of attitude formation—as is the focus 
of the current studies. Consumer psychology often applies principles from dual process models 
of persuasion when evaluating responses to advertisements. Persuasion is measured as liking for 
a target product or argument, but not change from prior attitudes about a target (e.g., Petty, 
Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). Models of attitude formation invoke both effortful, reasoned 
processes (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Zanna & Rempel, 1988) and heuristic-peripheral 
processes (e.g., Gordon & Holyoak, 1983). Attitudes can be formed based on accessible 
information (e.g., Wilson, Hodges & LaFleur, 1995) or stored attitudes activated automatically 




but adjusted based on other accessible information, such as group norms (Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000). The ELM and HSM agree attitudes can be constructions or stored evaluations 
depending on processing capacity and attitude strength (Wilson et al., 2000). Attitude formation 
occurs when an attitude is non-existent or weak (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993)—when 
bandwagoning is also mostly likely to occur (Rothschild & Malhotra, 2014). 
Persuasion by the Majority and Minority. Research supports both systematic and 
heuristic processing accounts of majority influence. Persuasion from conformity pressure is a 
peripheral cue—people focus on conforming and the argument is assumed to be valid simply 
because many people agree with it, but not based on the merits of the argument (Asch, 1952; 
Moscovici, 1980, 1985; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The majority position may be heuristically 
processed because it creates a situation in which people focus on the majority’s stated position 
and pressures to conform to the majority opinion, but not on the content of their arguments 
(Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983). 
Alternatively, people may elaborate more on, or systematically process, a position when 
it is supported by a majority (e.g., Harkins & Petty, 1981), while minority support can lead to 
heuristic processing. Processing type partially depends on prior attitudes, cognitive resources, 
and perceived relevance. People may use the information about the majority position to decide 
whether the message is even worth considering. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) argue when 
motivation to elaborate is low (e.g., low personal relevance, high distraction) majority 
information will be used as a peripheral cue; when motivation to elaborate is high, the position of 
the majority will not influence one’s attitude position. When people disagree with a majority 
opinion, they process messages more systematically (Mackie, 1987). Majority opinions are 




related issues. Mackie argues a majority consensus alerts people to the possible validity of their 
arguments or position and directs attention to processing these arguments as a result. Minority 
positions can also encourage systematic processing because people work to understand an 
alternative point of view (Moscovici, 1980, 1985; Nemeth, 1995; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985, 1987).  
Even when people have sufficient motivation or ability, they may still rely on the 
majority as a heuristic—but attitude change from heuristics results in shorter term change and 
less generalization. Majority messages motivate people to process information systematically, 
while messages from a numerical minority are systematically processed when they are difficult 
to ignore (De Vries, De Dreu, Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1996). Persuasive arguments from a 
majority compared to a minority only produced greater attitude change when message recipients 
had cognitive resources to engage in systematic processing (Schuurman, Siero, De Dreu, & 
Buunk, 1995). When an issue was self-relevant, messages with minority compared to majority 
support elicited more general thoughts, but majority compared to minority supported messages 
elicited more message-specific thoughts (Trost, Maass, & Kenrick, 1992). Majority support 
motivates systematic versus heuristic processing when the opinion initially differs from that of 
the decision maker, cognitive resources are available, and the issue is self-relevant.  
Persuasion and Groups. There are conflicting accounts of whether social information 
from groups is systematically/centrally or heuristically/peripherally processed—again processing 
partially depends on larger context. People were more persuaded by ingroup versus outgroup 
members when group memberships were salient, but not when group membership was not salient 
(McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994). The impact of group membership on attitudes 
depends seeing the categorization as self-relevant (McGarty et al., 1994). Important ingroups can 




enhances the central route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Systematic processing of group arguments 
occurs more for ingroup members. People were more persuaded by strong, but not weak, ingroup 
arguments, compared to strong or weak arguments from an outgroup—especially when the issue 
was relevant (versus irrelevant) to the ingroup (Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990). People were 
persuaded by an ingroup member when arguments were strong, but not weak, demonstrating the 
central message was attended to. People were unmotivated to elaborate when arguments were 
presented by an outgroup member—relying on heuristic processing instead. 
Research on minority influences defines minorities in numerical terms of group 
membership (e.g., two people in a group of five), but not in terms of underrepresented social 
identities. Numerical majorities in the minority influence context do not have to be without 
power or influence in a larger context (i.e., historically oppressed groups). Persuasion based on 
group identity focuses on messages from ingroup and outgroups. This research has not focused 
on messages from groups at different levels of abstraction. In the context of current studies, 
people are given minimal information—simply polls with the number of people that agree or 
disagree with an issue. People may therefore engage in peripheral/heuristic processing, because 
they only have group cues (social norms), without strong or weak arguments on which to 
elaborate. Conversely, participants may engage in central/systematic processing if the message is 
perceived to come from an ingroup, and the issue is self-relevant. Persuasion and influence from 
groups is further complicated by perceived conflict within and among groups. 
Conflicting Norms 
Conflict between the Individual and the Group. The individual does not always follow 
group norms and may resist social influence. One is more likely to resist group pressure with 




if the opinion is not reinforced by the group (Hochbaum, 1954; Noelle-Neumann, 1974).  
The normative conflict model (Packer, 2008) argues people will intentionally dissent 
when they perceive a conflict between the norm and another behavioral standard. Alternative 
standards can come from personal values, other group memberships, or standards of the group 
itself. Although self-categorization theory would predict that weak identifiers would conform 
less than strong identifiers (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Deshpandé et al., 1986), the normative 
conflict model argues strong identifiers may not conform in order to create positive change 
(dissent) while weak identifiers may not conform because other identities are more important 
(disengagement; Packer, 2009; Packer & Chasteen, 2010). Dissent is most likely to occur when 
group norms are the least important source of information compared to other standards. 
Dissent in the context of bandwagoning focuses on support for the underdog; people are 
more likely to support a minority position when they have high levels of information and 
strongly committed views (Bartels, 1988; Chaiken, 1987; Paterson, 1980) and more likely to 
follow a likely winner when self-relevance and consequences are high (Kim et al., 2008). 
Support for an underdog depends on one’s sense of fairness or view of social arrangements—
underdogs gain support when they exert greater effort, even with less ability (Vandello, 
Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007). Research has largely applied underdog support to contexts in 
which the underdog has agency (e.g., a sports team, a nation in conflict), not abstract, passive 
targets, such as social policies that cannot exert effort. Support for the underdog is largely still 
the exception to the rule and most studies on underdog effects focus on perceptions of a third 
party without consequence for the self. Bandwagoning is more likely when the group that 
approves of the majority is self-relevant. 




distinctiveness (Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Positive 
distinctiveness occurs when people shift their stereotypes and behaviors to maximize the 
differences between the ingroup and other groups to make the ingroup appear more positive and 
valued. When people perceived an outgroup as un-environmental, they perceived the ingroup as 
more environmental (i.e., caring for the environment, living sustainably). But when an outgroup 
was environmental, people perceived ingroups as less environmental (Rabinovich, Morton, 
Postmes, & Verplanken, 2012). Stereotypes about the ingroup relative to outgroups affected 
participants’ individual values and environmental behavioral intentions. The effect of conflict 
between outgroup and ingroup norms on behavior and attitudes can depend on whether the 
outgroup provides an upward or a downward social comparison for group standards. 
People may not only fail to conform to an outgroup, but will resist influence by an 
outgroup member. People view outgroup criticism of the ingroup as less legitimate and 
constructive—they react defensively and derogate the critic (Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey, 
Oppes, Sevensson, 2002). In contrast, an ingroup member can be viewed more positively when 
they criticize compared to praise the ingroup, especially when they are viewed as invested in the 
group (Hornsey et al., 2002; Hornsey, Trembath, & Gunthorpe, 2004). Counterintuitively, low 
group identifiers are influenced by both the ingroup and the outgroup than high group identifiers, 
who are predominantly influenced by the ingroup (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008). High 
group identifiers may look to the ingroup for information, but are not as attuned to or affected by 
outgroup information. 
In the intergroup context, group norms can provide strategic benefits. Norms coordinate 
group members to advance group interests. Individual conformity depends on perceived benefits 




less relevant to behavior or attitudes unless the outgroup has power and ability to monitor the 
ingroup (Reicher & Levine, 1994) or poses a threat requiring ingroup action (Gaertner & Insko, 
2000). People are more likely to favor the ingroup when their group has high versus low power.  
Low-status groups even show outgroup rather than ingroup favoritism in a minimal group 
paradigm, without past conflict or future consequences (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). People 
displayed more intergroup bias only when they perceived their group status was illegitimate, 
regardless of group power (Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, & Hogg, 2003). Intergroup bias was 
driven by lower ratings of the outgroup rather than higher ratings of the ingroup. People feel 
more distrust of the outgroup when the power structure is illegitimate. Hornsey and colleagues 
manipulated power as group representation in a student senate. This manipulation is similar to 
the current paper’s goal to investigate the effects of group representation on adherence to norms. 
Hornsey and colleagues found no effect of power on outgroup derogation, but this does not 
address adherence to norms. Group identification in these studies (not at the superordinate group, 
or group shared by multiple small groups, level) did not depend on perceived group power or 
legitimacy. People distrust the outgroup more when they perceive unjust representation, but not 
because they identify with their group more. This has implications for polls—if the ingroup is 
unfairly represented, people may distrust the poll and information provided by an outgroup in the 
poll, and be subsequently less likely to bandwagon. 
Ingroup-Ingroup Conflict. The majority of research has focused on the influence of 
ingroup norms or on the conflict between ingroup and outgroup norms—few studies have 
focused on the conflict between ingroups—two (or more) different group to which one belongs. 
Ingroup normative conflict can either demotivate or motivate action (McDonald, Fielding, & 




should increase to change the group’s behavior. People were energized, or had increased pro-
environmental intentions,  by conflicting environmental norms between important ingroup (e.g., 
family, friends, and peers/colleagues) when they had prior positive environmental attitudes and 
perceived high efficacy of individual action (McDonald, et al., 2013). They saw their behavior as 
important in making a difference in the environment when groups were inconsistent in 
environmental support. Perceptions of efficacy partially mediate the effect of norm conflict on 
pro-environmental behavior (McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2014). 
To my knowledge, no work has investigated the conflict between differing abstract levels 
of identification (e.g. nested identities). McDonald and colleagues (2013, 2014) investigated 
conflicts between ingroups (i.e., family, Australians, the community). They investigated the 
discrepancies in descriptive norms between two groups, controlling for prevailing norms. 
McDonald and colleagues also calculated the extent to which norms differed, but did not 
examine the extent to which participants viewed nested identities (e.g., household and 
community) as overlapping or related. In the current work, I am interested in the extent to which 
the norms of a larger, superordinate group affect attitudes as a function of subgroup membership. 
People inhabit multiple overlapping group identifications. I am a student at the University of 
Kansas (KU) but within this identity I belong to the smaller social category of graduate students. 
I share my KU identity with faculty and undergraduates, but our subgroup identities (faculty and 
graduate student) occasionally come into conflict with one another or with our larger KU 
identity. For example, faculty may differ in perceived importance of athletics compared to the 
attitude promoted by the larger University.  
In politics and polling, there are many potential conflicts among subgroup (e.g., identities 




multicultural societies is integrating multiple cultural groups as one national community (e.g., 
Citrin & Sears, 2014; Fredrickson, 1999). Pollsters frequently report trends among many 
overlapping and divergent subgroups (e.g., race, gender, national attitudes, state-level attitudes). 
Subgroups may see themselves as representative of the superordinate group, but also may 
perceive themselves as excluded from prototypes of the superordinate group based on subgroup 
status and power. I now turn to research on subgroup-superordinate group relations to further 
explore these possibilities and explain why I expect marginalized subgroups will perceive 
themselves as excluded from the superordinate group and the consequences of this for 
bandwagoning 
Subgroup/Superordinate Group Relations 
Ingroup Projection Model. The ingroup projection model (IPM; Mummendey & 
Wenzel, 1999) argues superordinate groups provide a basis for comparison between subgroups. 
Subgroups fit within the superordinate group, but have distinct characteristics, and norms. 
Groups project ingroup characteristics onto the superordinate group and view the ingroup as 
prototypical of the superordinate group. The more one identifies with both the superordinate 
group and the subgroup, the more they view the ingroup as prototypical and increase negative 
evaluations of other sub-outgroups (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). A vague, 
complex, and inclusive, more abstract representation (e.g., Europeans vs. West Germans) of a 
superordinate group attenuates ingroup projection—neither group is solely representative of the 
superordinate group (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Subgroups can agree on the 
legitimacy of disparities in superordinate group prototypicality, but generally people are biased 
to see their group as more positively valued by being more prototypical (Wenzel et al., 2007). 




more prototypical than other sub-outgroups1, but overestimate the degree of relative 
prototypicality that the sub-outgroup attributes to them (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & 
Boettcher, 2004; Wenzel et al., 2007). It is often the case that one subgroup is more 
representative of the superordinate group than other subgroups, in part due to group-based power 
and/or numerical differences in proportion of the superordinate group (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
Subgroup Relations. Subgroup membership within a superordinate group can lead to 
subgroup competition. People categorized only at the superordinate group level, compared to 
people only categorized at the subgroup level or at both the subgroup and superordinate group 
level, showed greater subgroup identification and inter-subgroup bias (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). 
Subgroup bias increases under only superordinate categorization potentially because 
superordinate categorization threatens subgroup identities and subgroup members attempt to 
restore subgroup boundaries. People categorized exclusively at the superordinate group level 
tend to dislike similar sub-outgroups more than dissimilar sub-outgroups—potentially in an 
attempt to increase subgroup optimal distinctiveness and restore subgroup boundaries (Brewer, 
1993). However, people simultaneously categorized as a subgroup and superordinate group 
showed more ingroup bias when the sub-outgroup was different rather than similar (Hornsey & 
Hogg, 2000b). Inter-subgroup bias increases when the superordinate group is seen as too 
inclusive, or subgroups are too similar to create optimal distinctiveness between subgroup 
(Brewer, 1991; Brewer, 1993; Hornsey & Hogg, 1999). Overly inclusive superordinate groups 
may encourage subgroups to emphasize their differences. This occurs even when subgroup 
boundaries are preserved within the superordinate group, partially depending on group power. 
                                                 
1 This is the case in many minority/majority contexts when widely shared beliefs about social reality suggest that 
one group is prototypical. For example, both Black and White Americans view White Americans as more 




People in low- versus high-status groups showed a greater desire to be categorized at the 
superordinate group level and people showed more bias when they were high-status and only 
superordinate group categorization was salient compared to multiple group salience (Hornsey & 
Hogg, 2002). When one subgroup has disproportionate control of the superordinate group, sub-
outgroup bias increases—likely in an attempt to maintain equal representation (Hornsey & Hogg, 
2000a). Subgroup relations depend on group boundaries and relationship with the superordinate 
group—subgroups are biased against one another, especially when categorized exclusively at the 
superordinate group level. Bias decreases when people are categorized at the subgroup and 
superordinate group levels simultaneously, but not when subgroups have unequal control or the 
superordinate groups is conceptualized too broadly. This research has focused on intergroup bias 
among subgroups, but not social influence among subgroups and superordinate groups. 
Subgroup Asymmetry. Subgroups may differ in adherence to superordinate group 
norms because of disparities in status and superordinate group identification. According to the 
subgroup asymmetry hypothesis, high status group members feel greater ownership over the 
nation than low status group members in two ways—1) high status groups feel greater national 
identification and 2) high status groups have a greater association between subgroup and 
superordinate identities than low status groups (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; 
Staerklé et al., 2010; Van Berkel et al., 2016). High status groups feel greater ownership over the 
nation in part because they have greater access to realistic (e.g., wealth, education) and symbolic 
resources (e.g., historical narratives, norms; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). Social representation of the superordinate (national) group is closely aligned with 
representation of high status groups (e.g., White Americans, men). White Americans are more 




Banaji, 2005; Devos, Gavin, & Quintana, 2010; Devos & Ma, 2008). People are more likely to 
associate men and masculinity than women and femininity with American identity (Van Berkel 
et al., 2016). Asymmetry in American national identification and perceived identification is not 
restricted to numeric differences—high-status numerical minorities (e.g., White South Africans) 
had slightly greater national identification than numerical minorities with less power (Staerklé et 
al., 2010). Women, who are roughly numerically equivalent with men, report lower national 
identification and lower correlations between national and gender identification than men and are 
perceived as less prototypically American than men (Van Berkel et al., 2016). Racial minorities 
who face discrimination feel a lower sense of belonging in the nation (Dovidio, Gluszek, John, 
Ditlmann, & Lagunes, 2010; Molina, Phillips, & Sidanius, 2015; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 
2010). Low-status subgroup members are seen as less prototypical and report lower 
identification with the superordinate group with potential downstream consequences for 
following the behavior and attitudes of the larger group. 
Subgroup Membership and Superordinate Norms. High-status subgroup members 
may follow superordinate group norms more than low-status subgroup members because they are 
viewed as more prototypical of the superordinate group and have greater control in defining the 
superordinate group (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1997; Terry et al., 1999). When superordinate and 
subgroup norms conflict, low-status group members may disengage from the superordinate norm 
to follow a potentially more central, subgroup (e.g., Packer, 2008). Subgroup-superordinate 
group relationships provide the opportunity for subgroups to be under or overrepresented within 
a superordinate group. If low-status subgroups see themselves as underrepresented in shaping 
superordinate norms, they may disengage from the norm or even perceive it as an outgroup 




increases systematic processing and discourages use of heuristic cues, including normative 
information.  
The Current Studies 
 The current studies examined the extent to which superordinate group norms influence 
people depending on subgroup status. How does subgroup-superordinate group conflict affect 
behavior and attitudes? Because low-status groups tend to be less represented and less identified 
with the national, superordinate group I expect:  
1) Low-status subgroup members will identify with the national, superordinate group less 
than will high-status subgroup members,  
2) Low-status subgroup members will see themselves as less represented in national polls 
than will high-status subgroup members,  
3) Low-status subgroup members will be less likely to adhere to the norms presented in 
national polls compared to high-status group members,  
4) Norm adherence will depend on perceived representation. Low-status subgroup 
members will bandwagon less than high-status subgroups members to the extent they see 
their group as underrepresented and less identified with the superordinate group, and  
5) Subgroups will be less likely to follow superordinate group norms when the issue is 
particularly relevant to subgroup interests because relevance discourages heuristic use.  
I tested these ideas in three studies about national policy issues. I chose policy issues 
rather than political candidates for two reasons: 1) policy issues can be non-partisan and 
therefore minimize influence by other important group identities and 2) policy issues can be 
chosen that are less familiar to participants than elections in a main election year and are more 




and reported perceived racial representation when no racial breakdown for the poll was provided. 
In Study 3, participants viewed a poll that either stated a majority of participants were men or 
women. I expect low-status group members will follow superordinate social norms less than 
high-status group members because they identify with the nation less and adherence to social 
norms will depend on subgroup representation (See Table 1 for hypotheses and results). 
Study 1 
 I examined the extent to which perceptions of subgroup representation affected responses 
to polling information. Participants viewed a poll that either indicated a majority of respondents 
supported the court order requiring Apple to help the FBI in unlocking the San Bernadino 
shooters’ iPhone or opposed the court order. Participants rated support for the court order and 
perceived racial group representation of the poll. 
 I expect minority, low-status subgroup members (i.e., Black Americans) will follow the 
superordinate (i.e., “American”) group norms less than majority, high-status subgroup members 
(i.e., White Americans), because minority subgroup members are viewed and view themselves as 
less part of the superordinate group compared to majority subgroup members. 
Method 
Participants 
 Based on a priori power analysis with 80% power, at least 158 participants were needed 
for a detectable f = .25 with p = .05. I recruited participants using Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk system (M-turk). White participants were recruited normally through M-turk; because the 
majority of M-turk workers are White (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), I did not need to 
specifically recruit White participants. Black participants were recruited using TurkPrime, which 




characteristics for a fee. Participants were excluded if they indicated any race/ethnicity other than 
White or Black. The final sample included 71 White and 76 Black participants (80 men, 67 
women, Mage = 34.11; See Appendix J). Participants were compensated $0.75.  
Procedure 
 Participants viewed a poll adapted for study purposes from PEW reports (PEW Research 
Center, 2016). The poll asked about support for Apple or for the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 
unlocking the iPhone of the shooters in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. The issue 
cuts across party lines—the slight majority of Republicans (56%) and Democrats (55%) favored 
the Justice Department with Independents evenly divided (42% not unlock; 45% unlock). 
Participants were told 1,002 American adults answered the question: “In response to a court 
order tied to ongoing FBI investigation of San Bernardino attacks, Apple should:” Participants 
were randomly assigned one of two conditions that counterbalanced which opinion represented 
the majority: the poll showed either a majority (61%) thought Apple should unlock the iPhone or 
a majority thought Apple should not unlock the iPhone. The opposing view was a minority 
(36%) with 3% always saying “Didn’t Know.” Data were collected while the issue was 
unresolved (See Appendix A). 
Measures  
Manipulation check. Participants indicated which policy position was leading the poll 
by selecting from the options: Should not unlock iPhone, Should unlock iPhone, Don’t know. 
This checked that participants paid attention to and correctly interpreted poll results (See 
Appendix B for Study 1 Measures). 
 Policy preference. Participants indicated their opinion on a 6-pt semantic differential 




scores indicated greater bandwagoning when the poll majority thought Apple should cooperate to 
unlock the iPhone, but lower scores indicated greater bandwagoning when the majority thought 
Apple should not cooperate to unlock the iPhone. 
 Policy party favorability. Participants rated the favorability of Apple and the DOJ using 
a 7-pt Likert scale (1 = Mostly unfavorable; 7 = Mostly favorable; MApple = 4.88, SDApple = 1.76, 
MDOJ = 3.79, SDDOJ = 3.79). 
 Time of Opinion. Participants indicated when they formed opinions about the policy 
issue, adapted from the American National Election Survey (ANES), using five categories (1 = 
Just now, 2 = In the last 3 days, 3 = In the last week, 4 = In the last month, 5 = Before that). The 
majority of participants reported they decided “in the last month” (32%), 23.1% decided “before 
that”, 27.9% “just now”, 12.2% “in the last week”, and 4.8% “in the last 3 days.”  
 Phone ownership. Because participants’ personal phone usage could affect their 
response to unlocking an iPhone, participants indicated whether they owned an iPhone (34.7%), 
a smartphone other than an iPhone (54.4%), a non-smartphone cellphone (8.8%), or no cellphone 
(2%). 
 Influence of poll. Participants self-reported the extent to which the poll factored into 
their opinions on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very Much) scale (M = 2.48, SD = 1.85). 
 Prior exposure to information. Participants reported the extent to which they had 
previously heard information (adapted from the ANES) about the conflict between Apple and the 
DOJ on a scale from 1 (A lot) to 7 (Nothing at all; M = 3.34, SD = 1.71).  
 Group representation. Participants indicated whether the poll was a good representation 





 Group identification. 
American identification. Participants indicated agreement with three items designed to 
measure American identification using a 7-pt Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly 
Agree). The items were: I am glad to be an American; I think that Americans have a lot to be 
proud of; The fact that I am an American is an important part of my identity. Items were adapted 
from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) and Leach et al. (2008; M = 5.09; SD = 1.53; α = .91; See 
Appendix I). 
Racial identification. Participants completed the same group identification measure as 
American identification, but for race/ethnicity (e.g., “I think that Black Americans have a lot to 
be proud of”). Participants saw a scale specific to the race/ethnicity indicated in demographics 




 Fifteen participants indicated the incorrect answer on the manipulation check, raising the 
possibility they did not attend to the poll information. These participants were excluded from 
further analysis. 
Identification 
 A 2 (Race: Black, White) ×2 (Condition: Unlock, Not Unlock) ANOVA indicated no 
significant interaction or main effect of race or condition on American identification, Fs < 2.75, 
all ps > .10. Contrary to expectations, participants did not significantly differ in American 
identification by race or condition (See Table 2 for means and standard deviations of dependent 




 A 2 (Race) ×2 (Condition) ANOVA indicated a marginally significant interaction 
between race and condition on racial identification, F(1, 128) = 3.39, p = .068 (see Table 5 for 
effect sizes). Black participants had significantly higher racial identification than White 
participants in both conditions, ps < .025.2 Black Americans had higher racial identification than 
White Americans and identification was not affected by poll condition. 
Perceived Race Representation 
 I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine whether participants viewed racial 
groups as represented in the poll with race and condition as between-subjects factors and 
perceived group representation as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of 
target race on perceived representation, F(1, 128) = 40.06, p < .001, f = .56 (See Figure 1). 
Participants saw White Americans as more represented in the poll (M = 5.13, SD = 1.43) than 
Black Americans (M = 4.29, SD = 1.53). No other interactions were significant, ps > .55. All 
participants saw comparative under-representation of Black Americans in the poll. 
I calculated a new variable to assess the extent to which participants saw their 
racial/ethnic group as represented. This variable was the perceived representation of the racial 
group that matched participants’ own racial group (e.g., White Americans’ perceived 
representation of White Americans; Black Americans’ perceived representation of Black 
Americans). There was a significant main effect of race, F(1, 128) = 6.78, p = .010, f = .23. 
White Americans (M = 5.08, SD = 1.38) perceived their race as significantly more represented 
than did Black Americans (M = 4.41, SD = 1.60). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant, ps > .70. White Americans perceived themselves as more represented than did Black 
                                                 
2 Black participants had slightly higher racial identification when unlocking the iPhone was the minority opinion 
than when it was the majority opinion, simple effects F(1, 128) = 2.95, p = .089, d = .50. White participants did not 
differ in racial identity between when unlocking the iPhone was the majority opinion and when it was the minority 




Americans and this was unaffected by the poll information. 
Bandwagoning by Race 
 I conducted a 2 (Race: Black, White) × 2 (Poll condition: Majority Unlock, Majority Not 
Unlock) ANOVA to examine the effects of poll by race. There was a significant interaction 
between race and condition, F(1, 128) = 6.04, p = .015 (See Figure 2). Black participants were 
significantly more likely to support unlocking the iPhone when that was the majority versus 
minority opinion, simple effects, F(1, 128) = 14.46, p < .001. White participants’ support for 
unlocking the iPhone did not differ by poll condition, p = .816. Counter to expectations, Black 
Americans bandwagoned, or followed the majority opinion presented in the poll, more than 
White Americans. 
 Black participants supported unlocking the iPhone more than White participants when the 
majority supported unlocking the iPhone, F(1, 128) = 9.06, p = .003. But not when the minority 
supported unlocking the iPhone, p = .641. Black and White participants were either not 
influenced by the poll when the majority did not support unlocking the iPhone, or were 
influenced in the same way. When the majority supported unlocking the iPhone, Black 
participants were influenced by the polling information more than White participants. 
 A 2×2 ANOVA indicated patterns in personal opinions about unlocking the iPhone did 
not extend to opinions about the parties involved. Black participants had a more favorable 
opinion of Apple (M = 5.14, SD = 1.75) than White participants (M = 4.54, SD = 1.79); F(1, 128) 
= 3.85, p = .052, f = .17. There was not a significant main effect of condition, or interaction 
between race and condition on opinion of Apple, ps > .10. Contrary to expectations, participants’ 
opinion of Apple differed by race, but was not affected by poll condition.  




= 4.07, SD = 1.65) than White participants (M = 3.41, SD = 1.72), F(1, 128) = 5.19, p = .024, f = 
.20. There was not a significant main effect of condition on opinions of the DOJ or interaction 
between race and condition on opinions of the DOJ, ps > .14. Contrary to expectations, 
participants’ opinion of the DOJ differed by race, but was not affected by poll condition. 
Bandwagon effects did not generalize to opinions about parties involved. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I created a bandwagoning 
score by standardizing participants’ opinions unlocking the iPhone within condition and reverse 
scored participants’ support for unlocking the iPhone in the condition in which unlocking the 
iPhone was the minority opinion—higher scores indicated greater bandwagoning. I tested 
whether perceived representation moderated the effect of race on bandwagoning using the 
PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 1.  
There was a significant interaction between race and perceived representation, β = .22, SE 
= .12, p = .06, 95% CI [-.01, .45]. Black Americans bandwagoned more the more they saw their 
racial group as represented, β = .22, SE = .07, p = .002, 95% CI [.08, .37]. White Americans’ 
bandwagoning did not depend on perceived racial representation, β = .00, SE = .09, p = .970, 
95% CI [-.18, .18]. The extent to which Black Americans bandwagoned depended on viewing 
their racial subgroup as represented within a poll of Americans. White Americans opinions did 
not depend on viewing their group as represented. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Identification. Racial effects on bandwagoning were not 
moderated by racial identification ps > .09.  
Other Variables of Interest 
 There were no significant main effects, or interactions on prior knowledge of the Apple-




familiarity with the issue. 
 There was a significant interaction between race and condition in the perceived relevance 
of the poll information to forming opinions, F(1, 128) = 5.73, p = .018. Black participants 
indicated being influenced by the poll more than White participants when the majority supported 
unlocking the iPhone, simple effects, F(1, 128) = 9.43, p = .003, but not when the majority did 
not support unlocking the iPhone, simple effects p = .751. Black participants reported being 
significantly more influenced when the majority versus minority supported unlocking the iPhone, 
simple effects F(1, 128) = 3.96, p = .049. White participants did not differ between conditions, 
simple effects p = .161. Participants accurately perceived their influence—Black Americans 
reported greater influence from the poll in the condition in which they followed the poll opinion 
more and more than White Americans. 
 Black and White participants did not significantly differ in the timing of opinion, χ2(4) = 
6.61, p = .158. Black and White participants did not decide their opinion on unlocking the 
iPhone any earlier or later than one another. There were no significant differences by race in type 
of phone ownership, χ2(3) = 1.54, p = .673. Black and White participants were equally likely to 
own an iPhone, smartphone, or cellphone. This suggests racial differences in bandwagoning 
cannot be explained by relevance of the issue to participants’ self-interest from type of phone 
ownership or from time of decision. 
Study 1 Discussion 
 Study 1 provided mixed support for hypotheses. Contrary to expectations, Black 
Americans followed superordinate group norms more than White Americans. But in support of 
hypothesis 2, Black Americans were more likely to bandwagon when they viewed their racial 




White Americans. Black Americans may have been more likely to bandwagon with the 
superordinate (and arguably seen as synonymous with White) norm for strategic reasons. 
Following the norm of an outgroup, or less similar group can reduce symbolic threat, make a 
shared identity salient, or signal a willingness to cooperate and engage in reciprocity (e.g., Louis 
et al., 2005). However, unlike Louis and colleagues, identification with the sub-ingroup 
predicted greater support for superordinate group norms in the current study, but only for Black 
Americans, the less represented group. White Americans’ susceptibility to polling information 
may not have depended on perceived representation because White Americans are seen as 
prototypical Americans more than racial minorities (Devos & Banaji, 2005). White Americans 
perceived higher racial representation within the poll than Black Americans overall. White 
Americans may assume a high level of representation and be less influenced by minor 
fluctuations in this representation. 
 Racial group differences in bandwagoning could not be explained by iPhone ownership, 
timing of decision, attitudes toward Apple or the DOJ, prior knowledge, or American 
identification. One might have expected Black Americans to be less trusting of the American 
government than White Americans, given the history of racial oppression in the U.S., but this 
history of oppression did not appear to influence attitudes towards the issue of unlocking iPhones 
or the DOJ, a government agency. 
 Black participants self-reported greater influence from the poll than White Americans, 
reflecting racial differences in following the norm of the poll. Poll influence is not necessarily an 
unconscious process—people shifted attitudes in line with the poll and were aware of poll 
influence. This conscious influence did not produce reactance (Brehm, 1966)—while White 




influence in the opposite direction of the poll. This suggests participants may not have felt their 
freedom of choice was restricted by the presentation of the poll. 
 One might suspect that the issue of terrorism and security issues would prompt 
participants to support security measures that infringe on the rights of others—and that this may 
be especially true of White Americans who are more threatened by a growing proportion of 
racial minorities (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2011). This alternative account is not 
supported by results—White Americans showed relatively low levels of support for unlocking 
the iPhone, even when that was the majority opinion. This suggests that the absence of 
bandwagoning effects for White Americans cannot be explained by ceiling effect preferences for 
heightened intrusive security measures when terrorism is salient. In Study 2, I move to test 
bandwagoning on issues that are less related to security and intergroup threat.  
Study 2 
 Study 1 results partially supported hypotheses—Black Americans, as a minority 
subgroup, were more influenced by poll information to the extent they saw their subgroup as 
represented within the superordinate group. But Black Americans followed superordinate group 
norms more than the national majority subgroup—White Americans, counter to expectations. It 
is possible differences in bandwagoning by race for Study 1 were specific to the issue of 
unlocking the iPhone. While there were no differences in cellphone ownership by race reported 
in Study 1, Black Americans are less likely to own iPhones (but not smartphones) than are White 
Americans (PEW Research Center, 2013)—iPhone issues may have therefore been more relevant 
to White compared to Black Americans. In Study 2A and Study 2B, I changed poll domains and 
expanded the participant sample to include Asian and Latino/a Americans. In Study 2, I tested 




would replicate using new polling domains and whether differences in following superordinate 
social norms would appear for multiple majority and minority subgroup comparisons. As in 
Study 1, I expected members of minority subgroups would bandwagon less than majority 
subgroup members and bandwagoning would depend on the perceived representation of the 
subgroup. 
Participants 
 For Study 2A and 2B, the same participants viewed two different polls about policy 
issues and reported opinions about each. This allowed me to conduct two follow-up studies using 
the same sample of participants.  
Based on a priori power analysis with 80% power, at least 244 participants were needed 
for a detectable f = .20 with p = .05. Participants were recruited using the M-turk system. I 
created four separate surveys to recruit, White, Black, Latino/a, and Asian Americans. 
Participants were directed to take the study only if they identified as the racial/ethnic category 
advertised. Participants identified their race/ethnicity at the beginning and end of the survey. At 
the end of the survey, I asked participants to be honest about their race/ethnicity, reminding them 
they would still be paid, but their honesty would improve the accuracy of data. Participants were 
excluded (n = 29) if they answered more than one survey (e.g., responded as both a White and a 
Black participant), changed racial/ethnic identification between the beginning and end of the 
survey, or identified as a race other than White, Black, Asian, or Latino/a. 
 Of the 263 remaining participants (160 men, 103 women), 64 were White Americans, 70 
Black Americans, 63 Latino/a Americans, and 66 Asian Americans (Mage = 32.48, SDage = 9.70). 
Participants were compensated $1.  





Study 2A. Participants viewed a poll ostensibly released by Gallup adapted for study 
purposes (Gallup, 2016). The poll asked about support for increasing the age at which people are 
eligible to receive full social security (SS) benefits. This issue was chosen because it is relatively 
non-partisan; both liberal and conservative people mostly support maintaining current benefits 
(PEW Research Center, 2014). Participants were told 1,002 American adults answered the 
question: “Assuming there would be no change in Social Security benefits for those who are now 
age 55 or older, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea to increase the age at which 
people are eligible to receive full benefits?” Participants were randomly assigned to see either a 
majority (63%) thought the age should be increased or should not be increased. The opposing 
view was a minority (34%) with 3% always saying “Didn’t Know” (See Appendix C). 
Study 2B. After completing measures for Study 2A, participants viewed a second poll 
ostensibly released by the PEW Research Center (but actually from Gallup, 2015). The poll 
asked about support for free trade between the U.S. and other North American countries. This 
issue was chosen because it is relatively non-partisan—Democrats (63%), Independents (63%), 
and Republicans (50%) tend to view trade as an opportunity (McCarthy, 2016). Participants were 
told 2,001 American adults answered the question: “In general, do you think that free trade 
agreements between the U.S. and other countries in North America are a good thing or a bad 
thing for the United States?” Participants were randomly assigned to see either a majority (72%) 
thought that free trade was a good thing for the U.S. or a bad thing. The opposing view was a 
minority (25%) with 3% always saying “Didn’t Know” (See Appendix E).  
Measures 




were asked about what the majority supported, their opinion on the issue (1 = Increase the 
eligibility age for full SS benefits/Free Trade is a good thing; 6 = Do not increase the eligibility 
age for full SS benefits/Free Trade is a bad thing), the time of their decision, support for the SS 
system/free trade in general, prior knowledge, the relevance of the poll to decisions, perceived 
representation of different racial/ethnic groups in the poll, national and racial identification. 
In addition to questions from Study 1, participants were asked about willingness to share 
their opinions with others on a 1-7 Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree; 
M = 5.20; SD = 1.60). Participants completed a three-item measure of feelings of being an 
outsider in the United States (Dovidio and colleagues, 2010). Participants indicated agreement 
with statements (e.g., “I feel like an outsider to the United States) on a scale from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree; M = 2.87, SD = 1.35; α = .66; See Appendices D and F). 
Study 2A Results 
Manipulation Check 
 Thirty-four participants (12.9%) indicated the incorrect answer on the manipulation 
check and were excluded from further analysis, leaving 229 participants. 
Identification 
 American Identification. A 2 (Condition) × 4 (Race) ANOVA indicated a significant 
interaction between race and condition on American identification, F(3, 215) = 2.69, p = .047 
(See Table 6 for means and standard deviations; See Tables 7 and 8 for correlations; See Table 9 
for effect sizes). Latino/a Americans had higher national identification when support for 
increasing the SS age was the minority versus the majority opinion, F(1, 215) = 7.29, p = .007. 
There were no significant differences between conditions for White, Black, and Asian 




 There were marginally significant differences by race when support for increasing the SS 
age was the minority, F(3, 215) = 2.57, p = .055; Latino/a Americans had significantly higher 
national identification than White, p = .008, and Black Americans, p = .052. There were no other 
significant differences between participants, ps > .16. There were no significant differences by 
race when support for increasing the SS age was the majority, p = .231. Contrary to hypotheses, 
White Americans did not have higher national identification compared to Black, Latino/a, and 
Asian Americans. Poll condition largely did not influence national identification—Latino/a 
Americans had higher national identification when the poll majority did not support increasing 
the SS age compared to White and Black Americans, but no other differences were significant. 
 Racial Identification. A 2×4 ANOVA indicated a significant interaction between race 
and condition on racial identification, F(1, 215) = 3.67, p = .013 (See Figure 3). Latino/a 
Americans had higher racial identification when support for increasing the SS age was the 
minority versus majority opinion, F(1, 215) = 8.51, p = .004. There were no significant 
differences between conditions for White, Black, and Asian participants, ps > .21.  
 There were significant differences by race when the majority supported increasing the SS 
age, simple effects F(3, 215) = 5.04, p = .002, f = .27. Black Americans had significantly higher 
racial identification than White, p = .001, and Latino/a Americans, p = .024, but not Asian 
Americans, p = .654. Asian Americans had significantly higher racial identification than White, 
p = .003, and Latino/a Americans, p = .059. There were no other significant differences by race 
when the majority supported increasing the SS age, ps > .26. 
 There were significant differences by race when the minority supported increasing the SS 
age, simple effects F(3, 215) = 6.93, p < .001, f = .31. White Americans had lower racial 




American had significantly higher racial identification than Asian Americans, p = .023. There 
were no other significant differences by race, ps > .13.  
In partial support of expectations, White Americans had lower racial identification than 
Black and Asians Americans in both conditions, and lower racial identification than Latino/a 
Americans when the majority did not support increasing the SS age. I did not have any specific a 
priori predictions about differences within racial minority subgroups, but there were significant 
differences within conditions. When the majority supported increasing the SS age, both Black 
and Asian Americans had higher racial identification than Latino/a Americans, but when the 
majority did not support increasing the SS age, Latino/a Americans had higher racial 
identification than Asian Americans; there were no other significant differences among racial 
minority subgroups. 
Perceived Race Representation 
 I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent to which participants viewed 
racial groups as represented in the poll with race and condition as between-subjects factors and 
perceived group representation as a within-subjects factor. There were significant differences in 
perceived racial representation, Wilks’ λ = .67, F(3, 217) = 34.98, p < .001, f = .70 (See Figure 
4). White Americans were seen as more represented than Black, Latino/a, and Asian Americans, 
ps < .001. Black Americans were seen as more represented than Latino/a and Asian Americans, 
ps < .001. There were no significant differences between Latino/a and Asian Americans, p = 
.314. As expected, White Americans were seen as the most represented racial group in a sample 
of Americans. I did not have any specific a priori predictions about differences within racial 
minority subgroups. Black Americans were seen as more represented than Asian and Latino/a 




Americans in the US population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014).  
There was no significant interaction between participant race and perceived racial 
representation or three-way interaction between participant race, condition, and perceived 
representation, ps > .09. All participants viewed White Americans as the most represented group, 
followed by Black Americans, and then equally Asian and Latino/a Americans 
I calculated a new variable to assess the extent to which participants saw their race as 
represented. This variable was the perceived representation of the racial group that matched 
participants’ racial group. There was no interaction between race and condition, p = .298 (See 
Figure 5). There was a main effect of condition, F(1, 219) = 11.81, p = .001, f = .23. People saw 
their group as more represented when SS eligibility age increases are the minority (M = 4.73, SD 
= 1.70) versus majority opinion (M = 3.99, SD = 1.65). There was a significant main effect of 
race, F(3, 219) = 3.68, p = .013, f = .22. White Americans saw themselves as significantly more 
represented in the poll (M = 4.98, SD = 1.48) than Black (M = 4.32, SD = 1.87), p = .037, Asian 
(M = 3.96, SD = 1.56), p = .001, and Latino/a Americans (M = 4.27, SD = 1.81), p = .025. There 
were no significant differences in perceived representation among Black, Asian, and Latino/a 
Americans, ps > .240. As expected, high-status, majority group members (White Americans) saw 
their group as more represented than did low-status, minority group members (Black, Latino/a, 
and Asian Americans). Unexpectedly, people saw their race, across racial subgroups, as more 
represented when the poll majority did not support increasing the SS age compared to when the 
poll majority supported increasing the SS age.  
Bandwagoning by Race 
 I conducted a 4 (Race) × 2 (Poll condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by race. 




= .072 (See Figure 6). Asian, Latino/a, and White Americans were significantly more likely to 
support increasing the eligibility age for SS when it was the majority versus minority opinion, 
simple effects Asian Americans: F(1, 219) = 19.05, p < .001; Latino/a Americans: F(1, 219) = 
4.89, p = .028; White Americans: F(1, 219) = 4.12, p = .044. Black Americans did not differ in 
support for increasing the SS age by condition, simple effects p = .573. Contrary to expectations, 
White Americans were equally likely to bandwagon as Latino/a and Asian Americans. In 
contrast to expectations and the results of Study 1, Black Americans opinions were not 
influenced by poll information. 
 When the majority supported increasing the SS age, White Americans did not differ in 
support compared to Black, Asian, or Latino/a Americans, simple effects ps > .10. Asian 
Americans supported increasing the SS age significantly less than Black, p = .002, and Latino/a 
Americans, p = .010. Black Americans did not differ in support for increasing the SS age 
compared to Latino/a Americans, p = .497. When the majority did not support increasing the SS 
age, there were no significant differences in policy support by race, ps > .12. Asian Americans 
supported increasing the SS age less than Black and Latino/a Americans when increasing the SS 
age was the majority opinion, but there were no other significant differences by race. The poll 
influenced the magnitude of opinion change differently within racial subgroups, but opinions of 
increasing the SS age were largely not different by racial subgroup within condition. 
 A 4×2 ANOVA indicated opinions of the SS system were not affected by race or 
condition—there were no significant main effects or interaction ps > .25. The effect of poll 
condition by race on increasing the SS age did not extend to opinions about the SS system. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I created a bandwagoning 




increased within condition and then reverse scoring participants’ support when increasing the SS 
age was the majority opinion—higher scores indicated greater bandwagoning. I tested whether 
perceived representation moderated the effect of race on bandwagoning using the PROCESS 
Macro for SPSS, Model 1. There was no interaction between race and perceived representation, 
β = -.02, SE = .04, p = .579, 95% CI [-.09, .05]. There was no main effect of race, β = .23, SE = 
.18, p = .186, 95% CI [-.11, .58], or perceived representation, β = .18, SE = .10, p = .075, 95% CI 
[-.02, .38]. Perceived representation of one’s race did not affect tendency to bandwagon. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Identification. Racial identification significantly 
moderated the effect of race on bandwagoning, β = .09, SE = .04, p = .039, 95% CI [.00, .17]. I 
probed the interaction using Preacher’s probing tool (quantpsy.org; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 
2006). For Latino/a and Asian Americans, racial identification significantly moderated 
bandwagoning, Latino/a Americans: simple slope β = .15, SE = .06, p = .010; Asian Americans: 
simple slope β = .24, SE = .09, p = .007. Latino/a and Asian Americans bandwagoned more, the 
more they identified with their race. The moderation was not significant for White or Black 
Americans, ps > .19. 
American identification did not significantly moderate the effect of race on 
bandwagoning, p = .457. 
Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue 
 There was a significant interaction between race and condition on participants’ prior 
knowledge of raising the SS age, F(3, 219) = 3.17, p = .025. Asian Americans indicated more 
prior knowledge when the minority versus majority supported increasing the SS age, simple 
effects F(1, 219) = 6.64, p = .011. Latino/a Americans indicated less prior knowledge when the 




.074. There was no significant difference between conditions for White and Black Americans, ps 
> .65. Contrary to expectations, participants partially differed by condition in perceived prior 
knowledge. When the poll majority did not support increasing the SS age, Asian Americans 
indicated greater prior knowledge and Latino/a Americans indicated less prior knowledge, while 
poll condition did not affect Black or White Americans. 
 When the majority did not support increasing the SS age, there were significant 
differences among participants by race, F(3, 219) = 5.41, p = .001, f = .27. Asian Americans 
indicated significantly more prior knowledge than White, Black, or Latino/a Americans, ps < 
.005. There were no other significant differences by participant race, ps > .48. When the majority 
supported increasing the SS age, there were no significant differences among participants by race 
in prior knowledge, p = .385. When the majority did not support increasing the SS age, Asian 
Americans indicated greater prior knowledge compared to all other racial groups. There were no 
differences by race when the majority supported increasing the SS age. 
 There was no significant interaction or main effects of race and condition in the perceived 
relevance of the poll information to forming opinions, ps > .09, in feelings of being an outsider, 
ps > .23, or in self-reported willingness to share opinions with others, ps > .43. Timing of 
opinion did not depend on participant race, χ2(12) = 14.49, p = .271. This suggests differences in 
bandwagoning cannot be explained by perceived influence, feelings of being an outsider, 
willingness to make opinions public, or timing of decision. 
Study 2B Results 
Manipulation Check  
Thirty-four participants (12.9%) indicated the incorrect answer on the manipulation 





 American Identification. There were no significant main effects or interactions of 
condition and race on American identification, ps > .18 (See Table 10 for means and standard 
deviations; See Tables 11 and 12 for correlations; See Table 13 for effect sizes). Contrary to 
expectations, participants did not differ in American identification by race. 
 Racial Identification. There was a significant main effect of race, F(3, 220) = 8.12, p < 
.001, f = .33; White Americans had significantly lower racial identification (M = 4.92, SD = 
1.68) than Black (M = 5.99, SD = 1.36, p < .001, d = .70), Latino/a (M = 6.01, SD = 1.26, p < 
.001, d = .73), and Asian Americans (M = 5.90, SD = 1.18, p < .001, d = .68). There were no 
other significant differences by race, ps > .67. White Americans, as a majority group, had lower 
racial identification than Black, Asian, and Latino/a Americans. There was no interaction 
between race and condition on racial identification or main effect of condition, ps > .525.  
Perceived Representation 
 I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent to which participants viewed 
racial groups as represented in the poll with race and condition as between-subjects factors and 
perceived group representation as a within-subjects factor. There were significant differences in 
perceived racial representation, Wilks’ λ = .68, F(3, 219) = 34.12, p < .001, f = .68 (See Figure 
7). White Americans were seen as more represented (M = 5.31, SD = 1.44) than Black (M = 4.40, 
SD = 1.61), Latino/a (M = 4.22, SD = 1.69), and Asian Americans (M = 4.22, SD = 1.74), ps < 
.001. Black Americans were seen as more represented than Latino/a, p = .018, and Asian 
Americans, p = .035. There were no significant differences between perceived representation of 
Latino/a and Asian Americans, p = .985. As expected White Americans, as a majority group, 




There was no significant interaction between participant race and perceived racial 
representation or three-way interaction between participant race, condition, and perceived 
representation, ps > .50. Participants’ perceived representation differed by target race, but not 
participant race or by condition. 
I calculated a new variable to assess the extent to which participants saw their race as 
represented. This variable was the perceived representation of the racial group that matched 
participants’ own racial group. There was a significant effect of race, F(3, 221) = 4.20, p = .006, 
f = .24 (See Figure 8). White Americans saw themselves as more represented in the poll (M = 
5.06, SD = 1.35) than Black (M = 4.16, SD = 1.71), p = .005, Asian (M = 4.01, SD = 1.70), p = 
.001 and Latino/a Americans (M = 4.49, SD = 1.89), p = .076. There were no significant 
differences in perceived representation among Black, Asian, and Latino/a Americans, ps > .130. 
There was not a significant interaction between race and condition or main effect of condition, ps 
> .70. In support of hypotheses, White Americans viewed themselves as more represented than 
did Black, Asian, or Latino/a Americans.  
Bandwagoning by Race 
 I conducted a 4 (Race: White, Black, Latino/a, Asian) × 2 (Poll condition: Trade is Good, 
Trade is Bad) ANOVA to examine poll effects by race. There was no interaction between Race 
and Condition, p = .322 (See Figure 9).  
There was a main effect of condition F(1, 221) = 32.24, p < .001, f = .38; participants 
viewed trade as better when the majority indicated trade was good (M = 2.52, SD = 1.50) than 
when the majority viewed trade negatively (M = 3.70, SD = 1.72). As hypothesized, participants 
bandwagoned—they were more likely to view trade negatively when that was the majority 




There was a main effect of race, F(3, 221) = 3.28, p = .022, f = .15. White Americans 
viewed trade more negatively (M = 3.58, SD = 1.62) than did Latino/a (M = 3.03, SD = 1.76), p = 
.067, d = .55, and Asian Americans (M = 2.65, SD = 1.62), p = .002, d = .57, but not Black 
Americans (M = 3.22, SD = 1.76), p = .215. Black Americans viewed trade more negatively than 
did Asian, p = .061, d = .33, but not Latino/a Americans, p = .543. Latino/a and Asian Americans 
did not significantly differ, p = .201. Overall, White Americans viewed free trade most 
negatively while Asian Americans viewed free trade most positively.  
 Though the interaction between race and condition was not significant, simple effects 
comparisons revealed a trend that White, Black, and Latino/a Americans’ views of trade differed 
between conditions in line with poll majorities, ps < .008. Asian Americans, however, did not 
differ between conditions, p = .187. This suggests Asian Americans bandwagoned less than 
White, Latino/a, and Black Americans; although, again, this trend was not significant. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I created a bandwagoning 
score by standardizing participants’ opinions on support for free trade within condition and 
reverse scoring participants’ support in the condition when most of the poll supported free 
trade—higher scores indicated more bandwagoning. I tested whether perceived representation 
moderated the effect of race on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 1. 
There was no interaction between race and perceived representation, or main effect of race or 
perceived representation, ps > .325. Perceived representation of one’s race did not affect 
tendency to bandwagon, or follow superordinate group norms. 
Bandwagoning Moderating by Identification. Racial and American identification did 
not moderate the effect of race on bandwagoning, ps > .36. 




There was no significant interaction or main effects of race and condition in the perceived 
relevance of the poll information to forming opinions, ps > .38, in prior knowledge of free trade 
agreements, ps > .09, in feelings of being an outsider, ps > .40, or willingness to share opinions 
with others, ps > .56. Timing of opinion did not depend on participant race, χ2(12) = 7.55, p = 
.819. Though participants differed in opinion of free trade by condition, they perceived 
themselves equally influenced by the poll direction, perceived similar levels of prior knowledge, 
and did not differ in timing of opinions. 
Study 2 Discussion 
 Contrary to expectations, racial minority subgroup members did not follow superordinate 
group norms less than majority subgroup members. In Study 2A, White, Asian, and Latino/a 
Americans bandwagoned, or adhered to superordinate group norms—Black Americans did not 
bandwagon, in direct conflict with results of Study 1. Bandwagoning did not depend on 
perceiving one’s race as represented for any racial subgroup. In Study 2B, all participants 
bandwagoned regardless of race. Asian Americans bandwagoned less than other racial 
subgroups, though this trend was not significant. Bandwagoning did not depend on perceiving 
one’s race as represented for any racial subgroup in Study 2B either. 
 In Study 2A, Latino/a and Asian Americans bandwagoned more, the more they identified 
with their racial group. This suggests that racial identification may influence tendency to 
bandwagon, as in Study 1. This does not explain, however, why White Americans bandwagoned 
independent of racial identification and Black Americans did not bandwagon independent of 
racial identification. Racial identification did not moderate bandwagoning for any racial 
subgroup in Study 2B. 




prior knowledge, American identification, perceived status as an outsider, or willingness to share 
opinions with others. 
 In Study 2A, Black Americans differed from other racial groups in adherence to 
superordinate groups. In Study 2B, Asian Americans differed from other racial groups in 
adherence to superordinate groups though this trend was not significant. Why did some minority 
subgroup members bandwagon while others did not—especially if perceived representation 
cannot explain differences? It is possible subgroup bandwagoning depends on the extent to 
which the issue is relevant to the subgroup. Self-relevance can lead to greater central processing 
and less reliance on polls as a heuristic cue (e.g., McGarty et al., 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
However, for no racial group did opinions about the poll issue generalize to attitudes about the 
parties involved in the issue, which suggests that people did not internalize the attitude change, 
but merely conformed to the group opinion (e.g., Mackie, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Self-
relevance by group membership can change how poll messages are processed and may explain 
subgroup differences in bandwagoning. 
Black Americans may not have been as influenced by superordinate group norms about 
social security in Study 2A because social security is more relevant to Black Americans than 
other racial groups. The Social Security Administration is race-neutral in assigning benefits, but 
the unique challenges facing individual ethnic groups (Black, Native, Asian, and Hispanic 
Americans) are presented on their website (www.ssa.gov/people). Social security is more 
important for Black Americans as a source of income over age 65 compared to White 
beneficiaries (Hendley & Bilimoria, 1999). Black children are more reliant on Social Security 
benefits compared to White children because of higher rates of disability and death before 




extending coverage of social security and opposed reducing benefits more than White and 
Hispanic Americans (PEW Research Center, 2014). However, Latino/a Americans are also more 
dependent on social security than White or Asian Americans (Fry, Kochhar, Passel, & Suro, 
2005) and Black and Latino/a Americans receive greater benefits relative to tax rates compared 
to White Americans (Government Accountability Office, 2003). Latino/a Americans did not 
show a similar resilience against influence, which suggests group differences in bandwagoning 
may not be due to relevance alone. Latino/a, Black, and White Americans did not differ in 
reported prior exposure to the issue—Asian Americans reported greater knowledge than other 
racial groups, but were not less likely to bandwagon. 
Similarly, Study 2B asked about free trade in North America, but the trade deal most 
widely discussed at the time of data collection was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP 
includes trade deals with many countries (e.g., Australia, Canada, Mexico, and Chile), but the 
trade deal is largely discussed with countries in the Asia-Pacific, and is part of President 
Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy (e.g., Collinson, 2015; Perlez, 2015). This strategy aims to 
expand and intensify the role of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region—free trade negotiations with 
South Korea opened the U.S. into TPP negotiations (Manyin et al., 2012). Recent rhetoric 
focuses on losing economic opportunities to foreign countries, especially China and India 
(McCormick & Dopp, 2016). Presumptive Republican Presidential nominee Donald Trump has 
made trade reform with China (namely “reclaiming” jobs from Chinese manufacturers) a policy 
cornerstone, but does not focus on North American free trade (www.donaldtrump.com). People 
rated Canada, Japan, EU countries, India, Brazil and Mexico as mostly favorable countries to 
trade with (over 50% saw it as good for the U.S.), but rated South Korea and China as the least 




PEW Research Polls describe views on trade by participant race, so it is unknown how different 
racial groups perceive U.S. free trade deals. Free trade might be perceived as mostly involving 
Asian countries and may have been seen as of more relevance to Asian Americans. The 
manipulation specified North American free trade, but I did not check to which countries 
participants thought the free trade issue pertained. I did not manipulate or assess perceived 
relevance of the issue to race. 
Relevance could have influenced participant responses in Study 2A and 2B through 
heuristic cues. When an issue is relevant to a subgroup’s group interest, they may engage in 
systematic processing more and use cues, like group norms, less (Mackie, 1987). In Study 3, I 
manipulate issue relevance by gender and assess perceived issue relevance in relation to 
bandwagoning. If perceived relevance of the issue to the subgroup affects adherence to 
superordinate group norms, then this would suggest subgroups do not differ in following 
superordinate group norms based on power, representation, or even identification, but rather 
based on how the issue affects subgroups differentially. If relevance affects adherence to 
superordinate group norms, then this would help explain why high-status subgroups did not 
bandwagon in Study 1, but some low-status subgroups did not bandwagon in Study 2 (and did so 
inconsistently). Subgroup differences in bandwagoning may not lie within group characteristics 
and inter/intragroup relations, but rather in issue characteristics as related to the subgroup.  
Study 3 
 Studies 1 and 2 examined whether subgroups followed superordinate group norms 
depending on perceived group representation with mixed results—in Study 1 Black participants’ 
adherence to superordinate group norms depended on perceived group representation; a similar 




racial/ethnic groups. Women and men are approximately numerically equivalent, but women are 
also underrepresented in control of the national, superordinate group (e.g., Van Berkel et al., 
2016). I explicitly manipulated subgroup numerical representation within the superordinate 
group and relevance of the poll issue (Issue 1 and Issue 2) to subgroup interests. In gender, like 
race, subgroups have unequal power within the superordinate group, but gender numerical 
proportions can be manipulated with greater realism than racial proportions—participants are 
unlikely to believe that Black Americans are a majority in a national poll. I expected participants 
to follow superordinate group norms the least when they were underrepresented and the issue 
was relevant to subgroup interests. 
Method 
Participants 
 Based on a priori power analysis with 80% power, at least 210 participants were needed 
for a detectable f = .25 with p = .05. The first group of 129 KU students (74 men, 55 women) 
participated for partial course credit. The majority of participants were White (77.5%); with 
7.8% Multi-racial, 6.2% Latino/a, 4.7% Black, and 3.9% Asian. This represented all participants 
we could collect in a semester, despite a long collection period. To augment the sample, I added 
82 participants (49 men, 33 women) from M-turk. The majority of participants were White 
(75.6%); with 11% Latino/a, 6.1% Asian, 4.9% Black, and 2.4% Multi-racial. Participant type 
was included in all analyses as a covariate. 
Procedure 
 Participants viewed two polls. Participants viewed a poll (Issue 1) ostensibly released by 
Gallup (but from PEW Research Center, 2016) about a relatively banal issue—support for a 




that either men or women were a majority of the poll (majority condition: 68% vs. 32%) and that 
majority either supported or opposed these discount cards (poll condition: 72% vs. 25%, with 3% 
undecided; See Appendix G). Participants reported attitudes before viewing a second poll.  
The second poll (Issue 2) ostensibly used the same sample as the first, but was about a 
gender-relevant issue—equal pay laws. The poll, adapted from Huffington Post/YouGov 
(Swanson, 2014), indicated a majority either thought current laws were about right or the 
government should enact more equal pay laws (69% to 28% with 3% undecided). Participants 
completed measures of attitudes and identity. 
Measures 
 Participants completed the same measures as Study 1. They were asked about what the 
majority supported, their opinion on the issue (Issue 1: 1 = Unacceptable; 6 = Acceptable; Issue 
2: 1 = Current Laws are about Right; 6 = Enact More Laws), the time of their decision, prior 
knowledge, the relevance of the poll to decisions, perceived representation of men and women in 
the poll, national and gender identification (See Appendix H).  
Participants were asked about how important each issue was to men and women on a 1-7 
Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all Important; 7 = Very Important) and personal importance of the 
issue on a 7 pt Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all Important; 7 = Very Important). 
I created a measure of politics (M = 4.11; SD = 2.49 r = -.81) by averaging self-reported 
political ideology (10-point semantic differential scale; 0 = liberal; 9 = conservative) and self-
reported political party affiliation (10-point semantic differential scale; 0 = Republican; 9 = 
Democrat; reverse scored). Politics was used as a covariate in all analyses. 
Results 




Nine participants were excluded from the KU sample due to a presentation error in the 
survey code. Four KU participants were excluded because they indicated they did not know the 
correct answer in response to the manipulation check. This leaves 198 participants for analysis. 
Issue 1: Grocery Discount Cards 
Identification.  
American identification. I conducted a 2 (Gender: Male, Female) × 2 (Poll Condition: 
Program is Unacceptable, Program is Acceptable) × 2 (Majority Condition: Women Minority, 
Women Majority) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender on American identification with 
politics and participant type (Student, M-turk worker) as covariates. Politics and participant type 
were used as covariates in all analyses. There was a marginally significant main effect of 
majority condition, F(1, 187) = 3.41, p = .066, f = .14 (See Table 14 for means and standard 
deviations; See Tables 15-17 for correlations; Table 18 for effect sizes); American identification 
was higher when women were the minority (M = 5.60, SD = 1.41) versus majority (M = 5.34, SD 
= 1.63). No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .18. Participants had higher 
American identification when women were a minority compared to a majority of the poll across 
gender and poll condition. 
Gender identification. I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll condition) × 2 (Majority 
Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender on gender identification. There were no 
significant main effects or interactions, ps > .20. Gender identification was not influenced by 
participant gender or polling information. 
Perceived Representation. I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent 
to which participants viewed gender groups as represented in the poll with gender, poll 




a within-subjects factor. There was a marginally significant four-way interaction, F(1, 187) = 
3.14, p = .078 (See Figure 10).  
Men and women viewed men as more represented when women were a minority versus 
majority of the poll both when the majority found the grocery discount cards unacceptable (Men: 
F(1, 187) = 4.78, p = .030, f = .16; Women: F(1, 187) = 4.35, p = .038, f = .15) and acceptable 
(Men: F(1, 187) = 13.71, p < .001, f = .27; Women: F(1, 187) = 7.53, p = .007, f = .20).  
Women and men viewed women as significantly more represented when women were a 
majority versus minority when the majority of the poll found the grocery program acceptable 
(Men: F(1, 187) = 4.89, p = .028, f = .16; Women: F(1, 187) = 3.01, p = .084, f = .13). Women, 
but not men, viewed women as significantly more represented when women were a majority 
versus minority of the poll when the majority of the poll found the grocery program 
unacceptable, women: F(1, 187) = 16.72, p < .001, f = .30; men: p = .109. Manipulation of 
gender representation was largely successful. Men were viewed as more represented when they 
were presented as a majority of the sample versus the minority in both poll conditions and across 
genders. Women were viewed as more represented when they were presented as the majority 
versus the minority by women in both poll conditions, but only by men in the condition in which 
the majority found the program acceptable (though means trended in the expected direction when 
the majority found the program unacceptable). 
Women viewed women as more represented when women were a majority of the poll and 
a majority of the poll thought grocery discount cards were unacceptable versus acceptable, 
simple effects F(1, 187) = 4.27, p = .040, f = .15. No other differences within participant gender 
within gender majority condition were significant, ps > .15. Results indicate poll condition only 




otherwise, the poll condition had no effect. This is consistent with hypotheses—counterbalancing 
condition should not affect perceived representation. Women may have perceived women as 
more represented when women were a majority and the poll was unacceptable versus acceptable 
potentially because the poll validated pre-existing opinions.  
Women viewed women as more represented than did men when women were a majority 
of the poll and the majority found the program unacceptable, simple effects F(1, 187) = 9.63, p = 
.002, f = .23. No other differences within participant gender within gender majority condition 
were significant, ps > .35. Results indicate the only difference between participant genders in 
perceived representation of target gender occurred when women were a majority and a poll 
majority thought the program was unacceptable. This indicates the manipulation of poll 
condition and gender majority condition largely influenced men and women equally. 
Women and men viewed men as more represented than women when women were a 
minority of the poll and the majority of the poll saw the program as unacceptable (Men: simple 
effects F(1, 187) = 2.90, p = .091, f = .12; Women: simple effects F(1, 187) = 4.76, p = .030, f = 
.16) and as acceptable (Men: simple effects F(1, 187) = 4.79, p = .030, f = .16; Women: simple 
effects F(1, 187) = 3.49, p = .063, f = .14). Women and men viewed men as less represented than 
women when women were a majority of the poll and the majority viewed the program as 
unacceptable (Men: simple effects F(1, 187) = 4.06, p = .045, f = .15; Women: simple effects 
F(1, 187) = 16.23, p < .001, f = .29) and as acceptable (Men: simple effects F(1, 187) = 13.63, p 
< .001, f = .27; Women: F(1, 187) = 6.43, p = .012, f = .18). Across poll conditions and 
participants gender, people viewed women were viewed as more represented than men when 
women were a majority of the poll sample and less represented than women when women were a 




majority condition affected men and women equally within poll condition. 
Perceived Relevance to Gender. I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine 
perceived gender-relevance of the issue with gender, poll condition, and majority condition as 
between-subjects factors and perceived group relevance as a within-subjects factor. There was a 
significant three-way interaction between gender condition, participant gender, and relevance to 
gender, F(1, 187) = 4.48, p = .036, f = .15. Women saw grocery discount cards as more relevant 
to women when women were the majority versus minority, simple effects F(1, 187) = 3.87, p = 
.051, f = .14. No other effects were significant within gender, ps > .23. When women were the 
majority, women saw the issue as more relevant to women than did men, simple effects F(1, 
187) = 13.08, p < .001, f = .26. No other differences between gender within majority condition 
were significant, ps > .24.  
When women were the minority, women and men viewed the issue as more relevant to 
women than to men, Men: simple effects F(1, 187) = 15.33, p < .001, f = .29; Women: simple 
effects F(1, 187) = 8.07, p = .005, f = .21. When women were the majority, women and men 
viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men, Men: simple effects F(1, 187) = 7.67, p 
= .006, f = .20; Women: simple effects F(1, 187) = 34.40, p < .001, f = .43.  
As expected, women viewed the issue as more relevant to women when women were the 
majority versus minority and as more relevant than did men when women were the majority. 
Men were unaffected by gender majority manipulation. Across conditions, women and men 
viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men. 
Bandwagoning by Gender. I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll Condition) × 2 (Majority 
Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects on bandwagoning by gender. There was a significant 




11). Men and women accepted the program more when the majority of the poll found the 
program acceptable (Mmen = 3.63, SDmen = 1.78; Mwomen = 4.50, SDwomen = 1.68) versus 
unacceptable (Mmen = 2.78, SDmen = 1.87; Mwomen = 2.32, SDwomen = 1.78), Men: simple effects 
F(1, 187) = 7.49, p = .007, f = .20; Women: simple effects F(1, 187) = 31.38, p < .001, f = .41. 
Men and women found the program more acceptable when that was the majority opinion. 
 Women accepted the program more than did men when the majority of the poll found the 
program acceptable, simple effects F(1, 187) = 4.81, p = .030, f = .16, but not unacceptable, 
simple effects p = .198. Though men and women both bandwagoned, women did so more when 
the norm was to support the program. 
 There was a significant interaction between participant gender and majority condition, 
F(1, 187) = 3.96, p = .048, f = .15. Women, but not men accepted the program significantly more 
when women were the majority (women: M = 3.95, SD = 1.96; men: M = 3.05, SD = 1.83) 
versus minority of the poll (women: M = 3.10, SD = 2.04; men: M = 3.25, SD = 1.92), women: 
simple effects F(1, 187) = 5.01, p = .026, f = .16; men: simple effects p = .647. Women 
supported the program marginally more than did men when women were the majority, simple 
effects F(1, 187) = 3.48, p = .064, f = .14, but not when women were the minority, simple effects 
p = .338. Women were influenced to like the program more when women were the majority of 
the poll sample. Gender majority did not interact with poll condition, so it cannot be concluded 
from this interaction that bandwagoning depended on group representation. 
 The interaction between majority condition and poll condition and the three-way 
interaction between gender, poll condition, and majority condition were not significant, ps > .53. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I calculated the extent to 




and men saw men as represented). I created a bandwagoning score by standardizing participants’ 
opinions on acceptability of the grocery cards within condition and reverse scoring participants’ 
opinion in the condition when the majority found the program unacceptable. I tested whether 
perceived representation moderated the effect of gender on bandwagoning using the PROCESS 
Macro for SPSS, Model 3. There were no significant main effects or interactions between 
majority condition, gender, and perceived gender representation on bandwagoning, ps > .64. 
Perceived representation of one’s gender did not affect tendency to bandwagon. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Identification. American and gender identification did 
not significantly moderate the effect of majority condition and gender on bandwagoning, ps > 
.20.  
Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Relevance. I tested whether perceived 
representation moderated the effect of gender on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for 
SPSS, Model 3. I calculated the extent to which participants perceived the issue as relevant to 
their gender (i.e., men’s perceived relevance to men, women’s perceived relevance to women). 
The three-way interaction between gender, majority condition, and perceived relevance to one’s 
gender was not significant, p = .160. There was a significant interaction between majority 
condition and perceived relevance, β = -.74, SE = .34, p = .032, 95% CI [-1.41, -.06]. I probed 
the interaction using Preacher’s probing tool (quantpsy.org; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). 
Participants who perceived low relevance to their gender (-1 SD), were not affected by majority 
condition, simple slope p = .269. People at medium (M) and high (+1 SD) levels of perceived 
gender relevance bandwagoned less when women were the majority versus the minority, simple 
slopes medium: β = -1.01, SE = .48, p = .034; high: β = -2.08, SE = .67, p = .002. 




= .37, p = .047, 95% CI [-1.48, -.01]. Participants who perceived low (-1 SD) and medium (M) 
relevance did not differ by gender, simple slope ps > .320. At high (+1 SD) levels of perceived 
gender relevance women bandwagoned less than did men, simple slopes β = -1.58, SE = .66, p = 
.017. The interaction between gender and majority condition was not significant, p = .451. 
Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue. There was a significant main 
effect of gender on prior knowledge of the issue, F(1, 187) = 4.48, p = .036, f = .15; men 
reported greater prior knowledge (M = 2.99, SD = 1.86) than did women (M = 2.48, SD = 1.78), 
even though people perceived the poll issue as more relevant to women. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant, ps > .19. Polling information did not affect perceived prior 
knowledge of the program. 
There was a marginally significant interaction between poll condition and gender on 
perceived importance of the issue, F(1, 187) = 3.36, p = .068, f = .14.When the program was 
viewed as unacceptable by the majority, women viewed the program as more important than 
men, simple effects, F(1, 187) = 6.10, p = .014, f = .18. There were no significant differences 
between participants by gender when the majority found the program acceptable, simple effects p 
= .912. Women, but not men, viewed the issue as more important when the majority thought the 
program was unacceptable versus acceptable, women: simple effects F(1, 187) = 3.48, p = .064, f 
= .14; men: simple effects p = .519. There were no significant interactions or main effects on 
perceived influence of the poll, ps > .18. Women perceived the program as more important when 
the majority thought it was unacceptable compared to acceptable and compared to men. Poll 
condition did not influence the extent to which men viewed the programs as important and 
importance of the program did not differ by gender majority condition. 




were more likely to have decided “Just now” (n = 75) and earlier than a month ago (n = 36) 
compared to women (njust now = 67; nbefore that = 12), ps < .05. Men and women did not 
significantly differ in any other cells. Men appear to be more polarized in the timing of their 
decision than women—they were more likely to have decided very early or at the last minute. 
Issue 2 
Identification.  
American identification. I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll condition: Keep current 
laws, Enact more laws) × 2 (Majority Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender on 
American identification. There was a marginally significant main effect of majority condition, 
F(1, 187) = 3.27, p = .072, f = .13; American identification was higher when women were the 
minority (M = 5.60, SD = 1.41) versus majority (M = 5.34, SD = 1.63; See Table 19 for means 
and standard deviations; Tables 20-22 for correlations; Table23 for effect sizes). No other main 
effects or interactions were significant, ps > .14. Men and women did not differ in American 
identification. Participants had higher American identification when women were a minority of 
the sample. 
Gender identification. I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll condition) × 2 (Majority 
Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender on gender identification. There were no 
significant main effects or interactions, ps > .10.  
Contrary to expectations, participants did not differ by gender in gender identification. 
Poll condition and gender majority condition did not affect gender identification. 
Perceived Representation. I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent 
to which participants viewed gender groups as represented in the poll with gender, poll 




a within-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction between poll condition and perceived 
representation, F(1, 187) = 10.59, p = .001, f = .24 (See Table 23; Figure 12). People viewed 
women as more represented when the majority supported enacting more laws (M = 5.08, SD = 
1.67) versus current laws (M = 4.30, SD = 1.74), simple effects F(1, 187) = 13.05, p < .001, f = 
.26. Perceived representation of men did not significantly differ by condition, simple effects p = 
.304. Women were perceived as more represented than men (M = 4.27, SD = 1.55) when the 
majority supported enacting more laws, simple effects F(1, 187) = 14.06, p < .001, f = .27, but 
not current laws, simple effects p = .425. Women were perceived as more represented when the 
majority supported more equal pay laws compared to current laws and compared to men. 
There was a significant interaction between gender majority condition and perceived 
representation, F(1, 187) = 121.79, p < .001, f = .81. People perceived men as more represented 
when women were a minority (M = 5.22, SD = 1.24) versus majority (M = 3.53, SD = 1.50), 
simple effects F(1, 187) = 74.77, p < .001, f = .63. People perceived women as less represented 
when women were a minority (M = 3.84, SD = 1.69) versus majority (M = 5.50, SD = 1.37), 
simple effects F(1, 187) = 56.98, p < .001, f = .55. Men were perceived as more represented than 
women when women were the minority, simple effects F(1, 187) = 39.28, p < .001, f = .46. 
Women were perceived as more represented than men when women were the majority, simple 
effects F(1, 187) = 87.49, p < .001, f = .68. Data indicate the gender manipulation was 
effective—women were perceived as more represented when they were the poll majority and 
men were perceived as more represented when they were the poll majority. 
No other interaction was significant, ps > .13.  
Perceived Relevance to Gender. I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the 




and majority condition as between-subjects factors, perceived group relevance as a within-
subjects factor. There was a marginally significant three-way interaction between gender 
condition, participant gender, and relevance to gender, F(1, 187) = 3.53, p = .062, f = .14.  
Women saw the issue as more relevant to women when women were the majority versus 
minority, simple effects F(1, 187) = 5.69, p = .018, f = .18. Women saw the issue as less relevant 
to men when women were the majority versus minority, simple effects F(1, 187) = 2.95, p = 
.087, f = .13. Men did not differ in perceived relevance to men and women between gender 
majority conditions, ps > .29. Gender majority of the sample affected women’s perception of 
gender relevance of the issue, but not men’s perception of gender relevance. 
When women were the minority, women saw the issue as less relevant to women than did 
men, simple effects F(1, 187) = 5.22, p = .023, f = .17. No other differences in perceived gender 
representation within majority condition were significant by participant gender, ps > .36. Except 
when judging relevance to women when women were a minority, men and women did not differ 
in perceived relevance to men and women within gender majority condition. 
Men and women viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men when women 
were the minority (Men: simple effects F(1, 187) = 78.10, p < .001, f = .65; Women: simple 
effects F(1, 187) = 32.27, p < .001, f = .42) and when women were the majority (Men: simple 
effects F(1, 187) = 88.58, p < .001, f = .69; Women: simple effects F(1, 187) = 90.66, p < .001, f 
= .70). People viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men across gender majority 
conditions and participant genders. 
No other high-order interactions were significant, ps > .20. 
Bandwagoning by Gender. I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll condition) × 2 (Majority 




way interaction between poll condition, majority condition, and participant gender, F(1, 187) = 
2.80, p = .096, f = .12 (See Figure 13).  
When their gender subgroup was a minority, both women and men supported equal pay 
laws marginally more when the poll majority supported enacting more laws versus current laws, 
women: simple effects F(1, 187) = 3.05, p = .083, f = .13; men: simple effects, F(1, 187) = 2.86, 
p = .093, f = .12 . Men and women did not significantly differ based on poll condition when their 
gender was a majority, simple effects ps > .80. Women supported equal pay laws more when 
women were a minority and the majority supported enacting more equal pay laws compared to 
current laws, but men did not differ by poll condition when women were a minority. When men 
were a minority, however, men supported equal pay laws more when the majority supported 
equal pay laws compared to current laws, but women did not differ by poll condition. 
Women supported enacting more laws when the majority of the poll supported enacting 
more laws and women were the minority versus majority of the sample, simple effects F(1, 187) 
= 6.87, p = .009, p = .19. No other differences within poll conditions were significant, ps > .16. 
Counter to expectations, women were influenced by the poll majority more when their group was 
a minority, but only when the majority opinion supported equal pay. 
 Women supported enacting equal pay laws more than did men when women were the 
minority of the poll and the majority of the poll supported current laws, simple effects F(1, 187) 
= 6.62, p = .011, f = .19, and enacting more laws, simple effects F(1, 187) = 16.95, p < .001, f = 
.30. Women supported equal pay laws marginally more than did men when women were the 
majority of the poll and the poll majority supported current laws, simple effects F(1, 187) = 3.10, 
p = .08, f = .13, but not when the majority supported enacting more laws, simple effects p = .984. 




was the majority position and women were in the majority of the poll. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I calculated the extent to 
which participants saw their gender as represented (i.e., women perceived women as represented; 
men saw men as represented). I tested whether perceived representation moderated the effect of 
gender and gender majority on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 3. 
There were no significant main effects or interactions, ps > .25. Perceived representation of one’s 
gender did not affect tendency to bandwagon, or follow superordinate group norms. 
Bandwagoning Moderated by Identification. American and gender identification did 
not significantly moderate the effect of majority condition and gender on bandwagoning, ps > 
.27.  
Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Relevance. I tested whether perceived 
relevance moderated the effect of gender on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for 
SPSS, Model 3. I calculated participants’ perception of the issue as relevant to their gender (i.e., 
men’s perceived relevance to men, women’s perceived relevance to women). The three-way 
interaction between gender, majority condition, and perceived relevance to one’s gender was not 
significant, p = .146. There was a significant interaction between majority condition and 
perceived relevance, B = -.78, SE = .334, p = .021, 95% CI [-1.44, -.12]. I probed the interaction 
using Preacher’s probing tool (quantpsy.org; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). For people who 
perceived low (-1 SD) and medium (mean) issue relevance to their gender, gender majority 
condition did not affect bandwagoning, simple slope ps > .19. People who perceived high (+1 
SD) issue relevance to their gender bandwagoned less when women were the majority, β = -1.63, 
SE = .83, p = .053. The interactions between gender and majority condition and between gender 




Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue. There was a marginally 
significant interaction between gender and majority condition on prior knowledge of the issue, 
F(1, 187) = 3.08, p = .081, f = .13; however, none of the simple effect comparisons were 
significant, ps > .14. No other interactions were significant, ps > .11. Prior knowledge did not 
differ by participant gender and was not affected by poll condition or majority condition. 
The three-way interaction between poll condition, majority condition, and gender on 
perceived issue importance was significant, F(1, 187) = 10.54, p = .001, f = .24. Women viewed 
the issue as more important when the majority supported more laws, when women were the 
minority versus majority, simple effects F(1, 187) = 7.43, p = .007, f = .20. There were no other 
significant differences between majority conditions within gender and poll condition, ps > .10.  
When the majority support current laws and enacting more laws women marginally 
viewed the issue as more important than did men when women were the minority, Current laws: 
simple effects F(1, 187) = 3.53, p = .062, f = .14; Enacting more laws: simple effects F(1, 187) = 
19.98, p < .001, f = .33. Women marginally viewed the issue as more important than did men 
when women were the majority and the majority supported current laws and, simple effects F(1, 
187) = 17.05, p < .001, f = .30, but not when the majority supported enacting current, simple 
effects F(1, 187) = .02, p = .895, f = .00. Women viewed the issue as more important than did 
men, except when the majority supported current laws and women were the majority. 
Women viewed the issue as more important when women were a majority and when the 
majority supported current laws versus enacting more laws, simple effects F(1, 187) = 4.34, p = 
.039, f = .15. Men marginally viewed the issue as more important when women were a majority 
and when the majority supported enacting more laws versus current laws, simple effects F(1, 




differences between poll conditions within gender, ps > .17. When women were a majority, men 
and women held opposing views about the importance of the issue depending on poll condition; 
women viewed the issue as more important when the majority supported current laws while men 
viewed the issue as more important when the majority supported enacting more laws. 
There was no significant interaction or main effects of gender, majority condition, or poll 
condition on perceived influence of the poll, ps > .14. Study conditions did not affect the extent 
to which participants perceived they were influenced by the poll. 
A chi-square test indicated no significant differences between men and women in the 
timing of opinion (e.g., “Just now,” “Before that (one month ago)”), χ2(3) = 4.95, p = .175. Men 
and women did not differ on when decided their opinion on equal pay laws. 
Comparisons between Issues 
Gender Representation. I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived 
representation of men with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and poll 
issue as a within-subjects factor. There were significant differences by condition, F(1, 191) = 
4.83, p = .029, f = .16 (See Figure 14). Men were seen as less represented when women were the 
majority (M = 3.79, SD = 1.54) versus minority (M = 4.91, SD = 1.46) for the grocery card issue, 
simple effects F(1, 191) = 27.74, p < .001, f = .38, and equal pay issue (Mmajority = 3.53, SDmajority 
= 1.50; Mminority = 5.22, SDminority = 1.24), simple effects F(1, 191) = 27.74, p < .001, f = .62. 
There were no significant differences between issues within majority condition, simple effects ps 
> .10. No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .10.  
I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived representation of women with 
gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and poll issue as a within-subjects 




.14. Women were seen as more represented when women were the majority (M = 5.10, SD = 
1.55) versus minority (M = 4.04, SD = 1.54) for grocery card issue, simple effects F(1, 191) = 
23.86, p < .001, f = .35, and equal pay issue (Mmajority = 5.50, SDmajority = 1.37; Mminority = 3.84, 
SDminority = 1.69), simple effects F(1, 191) = 53.76, p < .001, f = .53. There was a marginally 
significant difference between issues when women were the majority, F(1, 191) = 3.16, p = .077, 
f = .13, but not the minority, p = .318. People saw women as more represented in the equal pay 
than the grocery card issue when women were a majority. There was no significant interaction 
between gender and gender condition p = .222.  
The manipulation of gender representation affected perceived gender representation—
men were seen as less represented and women were seen as more represented when women were 
the majority versus minority of the poll. Men’s representation as not affected by poll issue, but 
women were seen as more represented when they were presented as the majority and the issue 
was about equal pay (more gender-relevant) compared to grocery cards (less gender-relevant). 
Gender Relevance. I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived 
relevance of the issue to men with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and 
poll issue as a within-subjects factor. There were no significant main effects or interactions, ps > 
.28. Perceived relevance of the issue to men did not differ by study condition. 
I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived relevance of the issue to 
women with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and poll issue as a 
within-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction between participant gender and poll 
issue, F(1, 191) = 9.47, p = .002, f = .22. Both men and women saw pay equality as more 
relevant to women (Mmen = 6.37, SDmen = .99; Mwomen = 6.08, SDwomen = 1.13) than grocery 




23.61, p < .001, f = .35; Men: F(1, 191) = 109.52, p < .001, f = .76. No other interactions were 
significant, p > .70. People perceived the equal pay issue as more relevant to woman than the 
grocery discount cards regardless of gender.  
Bandwagoning. I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine bandwagoning with 
gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and bandwagoning (using the variable 
calculated to collapse across conditions) for each issue as a within-subjects factor. There was a 
marginally significant three-way interaction between participant gender, majority condition, and 
agreement with the poll majority, F(1, 191) = 3.29, p = .071, f = .13 (See Figure 15).  
Women bandwagoned marginally more for the grocery card compared to the equal pay 
issue, when women were the majority, simple effects F(1, 191) = 2.98, p = .086, f = .12. Women 
bandwagoned significantly more than men for the grocery card issue when women were the 
majority, F(1, 191) = 7.20, p = .008, f = .19; and marginally more for the equal pay issue when 
women were the minority, simple effects F(1, 191) = 2.91, p = .088, f = .12. No other differences 
simple effects were significant, ps > .13.  
When women were a majority, women were more likely to bandwagon for the grocery 
card issue, compared to the equal pay issue. Women were more likely than men to bandwagon 
for the grocery card issue when women were the majority. However, for the equal pay issue 
women were more likely than men to bandwagon when women were the minority.  
 Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue. I conducted a mixed-model 
ANOVA to examine prior exposure to information about the issue with gender and majority 
condition as between-subjects factors and prior knowledge of each poll issue as a within-subjects 
factor. There was a significant main effect of issue, F(1, 191) = 58.31, p < .001, f = .55. 




grocery discount programs (M = 2.78, SD = 1.84). No interactions were significant, ps > .11. 
Participants reported greater prior knowledge of the equal pay issue than the grocery cards issue, 
but reported exposure to the issue did not differ by participant gender. I expected participants 
would be more familiar with equal pay than with grocery discount cards because equal pay is 
frequently discussed (for example Equal Pay Day is designed to encourage discussion of the 
issue) while grocery cards are frequently used, but discussed less frequently. I expected women 
may be more familiar with equal pay issues than men because equal pay is more in their self-
interest, but this expectation was not supported. 
I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived importance of the issue with 
gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and reported importance of poll issue 
as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction between participant gender and 
issue, F(1, 191) = 9.39, p = .003, f = .22. Both men and women saw pay equality as more 
important (Mmen = 4.20, SDmen = 1.71; Mwomen = 5.53, SDwomen = 1.56) than grocery discount 
cards (Mmen = 3.06, SDmen = 1.66; Mwomen = 3.36, SDwomen = 1.47), Men: F(1, 191) = 40.47, p < 
.001, f = .46; Women: F(1, 191) = 89.52, p < .001, f = .68. Women thought pay equality was 
more important than did men, F(1, 191) = 28.14, p < .001, f = .38, but importance of grocery 
cards did not differ by gender, p = .115. No other interactions were significant, ps > .24. As 
expected, women perceived equal pay as more important than did men. Perceived importance of 
the grocery cards issue did not differ by participant gender. 
I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived influence from the poll with 
gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and reported influence of the poll as a 
within-subjects factor. No main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .45. Gender 




influence from the polling information, despite differences in influence across gender-relevant 
conditions by participant gender and gender majority. 
Self-reported timing of the participants’ decision differed by relevance of the issue to 
gender, χ2(12) = 108.32, p < .001. For the grocery card issue, participants were more likely to 
have decided their stance “Just now” (n = 142) compared to “Before that” (n = 48), but for the 
equal pay issue participants were more likely to have decided their stance “Before that” (n = 133) 
compared to “Just now” (n = 53). For both issues, there was a tendency for participants to be 
polarized in the timing of decision (either “Just now” or “Before that”) with only 17 participants 
reporting decisions in between for either issue. Differences between poll issue conditions 
appeared for both men, χ2(12) = 124.21, p < .001, and women, χ2(9) = 17.72, p = .039. 
Study 3 Discussion 
Women and men bandwagoned equally when the issue was less relevant to gender (data 
sharing grocery discount cards). When the issue was more gender-relevant (equal pay laws), 
women were influenced by the poll opinion more when their group was underrepresented and the 
majority opinion supported enacting more equal pay laws compared to when the majority 
supported current laws, contrary to hypotheses. Participants did not differ in support for enacting 
more equal pay laws between any other poll conditions. Overall, women supported equal pay 
laws more than did men except when their gender was represented and equal pay laws were the 
majority opinion. As expected, women were more likely to bandwagon for the less gender-
relevant issue than the more gender-relevant issue when women were the majority (represented). 
Bandwagoning was not influenced by perceived representation for either issue or gender. 
Manipulation checks indicate manipulations of gender majority status were effective; 




sample compared to men and compared to when they were presented as a minority. Men were 
seen as more represented when they were presented as a majority of the poll sample compared to 
women and compared to when they were presented as a minority.  
Results provided mixed support for hypotheses. Women did not identify with the nation 
less than men or with their gender more than did men (Hypothesis 1). Women and men did see 
their subgroup as more represented when their subgroup was presented as the majority versus the 
minority of the poll sample (Hypothesis 2). Women did not bandwagon less overall than men 
(Hypothesis 3). Women and men both bandwagoned for the grocery card issue (Issue 1); men 
and women differed in bandwagoning on equal pay (Issue 2). Subgroup representation did affect 
bandwagoning, but in inconsistent patterns (Hypothesis 4). For the grocery card issue (Issue 1), 
only women bandwagoned when their group was a majority versus a minority. For the equal pay 
issue, women and men bandwagoned when their group was a minority, but not a majority. 
Perceived representation did not moderate bandwagon effects. Data partially supported 
hypothesis 5—women were more likely than men to bandwagon when their group was 
represented for the grocery card issue (less gender-relevant issue) than the equal pay issue (more 
gender-relevant issue) and women were more likely to bandwagon for the grocery issue 
compared to the equal pay issue when their group was represented. Participants bandwagoned 
less when women were the majority and the issue (for both issues) was seen as gender-relevant. 
For the grocery card issue, women bandwagoned less than men when they perceived the issue as 
relevant to their gender. The grocery card issue was still viewed as more relevant to women than 
to men, and was not entirely gender-neutral. 
 The relevance of the issue may influence processing information (Mackie, 1987). When 




especially when a typically underrepresented group sees their group is well-represented. When 
the issue is gender-relevant, however, participants may engage in more effortful processing. 
Women were less likely to follow superordinate group norms when women were represented for 
a gender-relevant issue compared to a gender-irrelevant issue—women were less likely to use 
poll norms or representation as a heuristic cue. 
Why did women bandwagon regardless of representation for a less gender-relevant issue, 
but bandwagoned more, or did not bandwagon, when they were underrepresented in a gender-
relevant poll? When women’s opinions are represented, they feel freer to express opinions 
independent of poll influence. But women may be energized to support gender-relevant positions 
when those positons are supported by the majority of a group even when the subgroup is 
underrepresented. McDonald and colleagues (2013) showed people were motivated by conflict 
between norms to engage in pro-environmental behavior when they held pre-existing pro-
environmental attitudes. Similarly, women may see their opinion expression as more effective to 
influencing the superordinate group when the superordinate group supports gender equality 
(assuming women support equal pay laws), but there is still conflict within the superordinate 
group. In contrast, women may be demotivated to take action in support of women’s interest 
when they are a minority and the superordinate group supports maintaining the status quo. 
Superordinate group support for the status quo may signal that engaging in a behavior is not 
effective because not everybody is acting or the behavior will not achieve the desired outcome 
(Olson, 1971; Ellen, Winer, & Cobb-Walgren, 1991). Without a measure of women’s prior 
attitudes, it cannot be concluded women are energized when they are underrepresented, but 
supported by the majority, and demotivated when women are underrepresented and not 




accurate understanding of attitude changes from polls.  
 I expected men would have higher national identification than would women because 
they have greater control over material and symbolic resources (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999) and women would have higher gender identification than men. Contrary to these 
expectations, men and women did not differ in identification. Gender majority condition 
unexpectedly did influence national identification; participants had higher identification when 
women were a minority, rather than a majority of the sample. It is possible national identification 
was higher when women were a minority, because this condition reifies a masculine construction 
of U.S. national identification (Van Berkel et al., 2016). People may have identified with the 
nation when the poll sample reflected gender disparities present in national representations. 
 Manipulation of gender relevance was partially successful. People viewed the gender-
relevant issue, equal pay, as more relevant to women than the gender-irrelevant issue, grocery 
discount cards. Relevance of the issue to men did not differ by issue type. People perceived both 
issues as more relevant to women than to men, contrary to expectations. The grocery store 
discount cards were intended to be gender-neutral, as this issue sharing data with third parties is 
not unique to one gender. However, people may perceive grocery cards as more relevant to 
women than to men because traditional gender roles dictate that women grocery shop more than 
men (e.g., Schafer & Schafer, 1989). This is may be especially true for undergraduate freshmen, 
who are less likely to grocery shop than M-turk participants. 
Perceived personal importance differed by poll condition. For the less gender-relevant 
issue, women, but not men, viewed the program as more important when the majority found the 
program unacceptable versus acceptable. For the gender-relevant issue, women viewed the issue 




more important when the majority supported enacting more equal pay laws. Differences in issue 
importance by gender may reflect pre-existing attitudes—men and women view the issue as 
more important when the superordinate group favors policies that “disadvantage” their gender 
subgroup. Men and women both viewed pay equality as more important than grocery cards.  
Prior knowledge of either issue, perceived impact of the poll, and timing of opinion did 
not predict tendency to bandwagon. 
General Discussion 
 I expected low-status subgroup members would identify with the national, superordinate 
group less than would high-status subgroup members (Hypothesis 1; See Table 1). Across three 
studies, this hypothesis was not supported. Low-status and high-status subgroup members in 
terms of race and gender did not differ in national identification—in contrast to the subgroup 
asymmetry hypothesis (Sidanius et al., 1997; Staerklé et al., 2010; Van Berkel et al., 2016). In 
Study 2A, Latino/a Americans had higher levels of national identification. 
 I expected low-status subgroup members would see themselves as less represented in 
national polls than will high-status subgroup members (Hypothesis 2). As expected, participants 
saw White Americans (the high status subgroup) as more represented than racial minorities 
(relatively low-status subgroups) in Studies 1-2. Representation manipulations were effective in 
Study 3. People saw women as more represented than men when they were the majority and 
compared to when women were the minority. People saw men as more represented than women 
when they were the majority and compared to when men were the minority.  
 I predicted low-status subgroup members would bandwagon less than high-status 
subgroup members because they would see their group as less represented and identified with the 




fairly consistent pattern of bandwagoning—people followed the superordinate group norms. 
Members of low-status subgroup tended to bandwagon equal to or more than members of high-
status subgroups with two exceptions: in Study 2A, Black Americans did not bandwagon and in 
Study 2B, Asian Americans did not bandwagon, though this trend was not significant. 
There was only minor support for the main hypothesis (Hypothesis 4)—that 
bandwagoning depends on viewing one’s subgroup as represented. In Study 1, Black Americans’ 
adherence to superordinate group norms did depend on perceived representation, though they 
bandwagoned more than White Americans. This pattern did not appear in Study 2. In Study 3, 
women and men both bandwagoned for a less gender-relevant issue independent of whether their 
gender subgroup was a majority or a minority. Women actually bandwagoned more on a more 
gender-relevant issue when women were a minority versus a majority of the poll sample.  
 Study 3 provided evidence that, as expected (Hypothesis 5), relevance of the issue to 
subgroup interests affected adherence to superordinate group norms. When the issue was less 
gender-relevant, both men and women bandwagoned; however, when the issue was more gender-
relevant, bandwagon effects diminished for women. Women and men saw equal pay laws as 
more relevant to women than grocery discount cards, the grocery discount cards were still seen 
as more relevant to women than to men—the issue was not entirely gender-neutral as intended. 
Participants bandwagoned less when women were the majority and the issue was seen as gender-
relevant. Women bandwagoned less than did men when they perceived the issue as gender-
relevant for the less gender-relevant issue.  
Relevance may encourage people to use systematic, central processing (e.g., Trost et al., 
1992); people may have been less likely to use the polling information as a heuristic cue when 




persuasion messages: value-relevant involvement, outcome-relevant involvement, and 
impression relevant involvement. It is likely in these particular studies that an association 
between an attitude and the self will be activated because participants should be concerned about 
impression relevant involvement (fitting in with their ingroup) and outcome relevant 
involvement (the issue may have been salient with a participant’s subgroup’s goals—equal pay, 
social security benefits). People with high involvement based on outcome and impression 
management tend to be less persuaded than people with low involvement, or persuaded only by 
strong, but not weak arguments (Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). 
A limitation of assessing relevance in the current work was the use of within-subjects 
design. All participants viewed the gender-relevant issue second in Study 3 and relevance was a 
possible explanation for Study 2 subgroup differences, but was not assessed directly. 
Bandwagoning may have decreased for a gender-relevant issue because participants ascertained 
the study purpose and resisted influence. Future studies should further explore the role of 
relevance by randomly assigning participants to comparable subgroup relevant versus subgroup 
irrelevant issues (between-subjects design) or by randomizing the order of issue presentation. 
Social Norms or Anchoring? 
 Bandwagoning occurred across all three studies for some subgroups. When the majority 
of a poll indicated a particular stance on an issue, participants were more likely to take the same 
stance. There were a few exceptions to bandwagon effects, but little consistency in norm-
resisting subgroup characteristics. Study 3 provides partial evidence bandwagoning may not 
occur for some group members when the issue is of special interest to their subgroup. 
Membership in a historically disenfranchised subgroup does not predict lower levels of 




as more represented than low-status groups in national polls and accurately perceived 
manipulated majorities, low-status subgroup participants did not have lower superordinate group 
identification and were not less likely to follow superordinate group norms. 
 It is possible people did not follow the poll as a social cue necessarily, but that the poll 
provided an anchor on which participants based judgments. Because participants did not differ 
by perceived representation (with one exception in Study 1) participants may have used the poll 
as an anchor regardless of group affiliation. Participants may have used the poll as a starting 
point on which to adjust attitudes—they decided whether they agreed more or less than the group 
in an anchor-and-adjustment type process (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In deciding their 
opinion, participants may be more likely to start with the majority opinion as an anchor and 
selectively generate or access knowledge consistent with the majority opinion and less likely to 
generate arguments for the opposition (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). This may also explain 
why bandwagoning was diminished for the more versus less gender-relevant issue in Study 3—
the poll margins were narrower. Bandwagoning effects sizes were similarly smaller for the 
smaller poll margin in Study 2A compared to Study 2B (except for Asian Americans). Much of 
the research on anchoring focuses on numerical (e.g., the year of an election, the average 
temperature), not attitudinal judgements. I asked participants about their judgments on a scale 
with greater point range than were presented in the poll (categorical, discrete choices)—it is 
therefore unclear if participants used poll as an anchor to a different rating scale. 
If the poll provided socially normative information about the acceptability of the polling 
issue to the (sub)group, then we might expect attitudes to generalize to other related attitudes. 
Participants should not necessarily generalize attitudes if the group information only provided an 




related attitudes, generalization did not occur. Although a poll indicated more or less favorable 
attitudes toward Apple, the DOJ, Social Security, and free trade, participants tended to follow the 
superordinate group norm in answering the poll questions themselves, but did not generalize 
answers to the poll question to attitudes about the target parties (e.g., followed the norm in 
whether free trade “was a good thing” in response to the poll question, but did not differ by 
condition in opinion of free trade generally). Poll questions and general attitudes were correlated 
overall (rs = -.89-.33), except for social security (r = .04). Polling information may have 
provided a social anchor for participants’ answers to the polling question rather than influencing 
formation of attitudes about the issue and parties involved.  
It is possible subgroups did not differ in the extent to which they followed the opinion in 
the poll, but differed by status in how the poll was used. High-status subgroups, for example may 
have used the poll as social information, while low-status subgroups used the poll as an anchor—
though this prediction is not supported by subgroup differences in generalization. Future studies 
should further investigate the extent to which the poll serves as an anchor or as a norm by asking 
participants comparing their attitudes to the group or using the group as a source of information. 
One could manipulate the instructions to prime participants to use the poll as an anchor or as 
normative information. Use of a poll from an outgroup would assist in teasing apart whether the 
poll provides cognitive anchors to base judgments or provides socially normative information 
that shapes judgement based on identity.  
Social Norms and Similarity 
 As expected, racial minorities were viewed as less represented than racial majorities. 
Based on self-categorization theory and the subgroup asymmetry hypothesis (e.g., Sidanius et al., 




themselves as less similar to the superordinate group and this difference in perceived similarity 
would cause minorities to be less influenced by the superordinate norms. High status subgroups 
have greater control in shaping the superordinate group through access to symbolic and material 
resources (e.g., Pratto et al., 2006). Disproportionate control of a superordinate group can lead to 
greater inter-subgroup competition as subgroups strive to optimize positive, distinctive 
characteristics (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Contrary to expectations, perceived representation did 
not affect tendency to follow superordinate group norms. 
 This expected relationship between group representation and adherence to norms may not 
have occurred because representation is not necessarily the same as perceived similarity. I only 
assessed participants’ perception of their subgroup as represented within the superordinate group 
and perception of the issue in question as important to their group—I did not assess perceived 
similarity to the superordinate group. Given that subgroups did not reliably differ based on group 
status, it is unlikely subgroup differences in perceived similarity would have explained 
homogeneity among group members or differences in perceived similarity would have emerged 
among subgroup members. Additional research on perceived similarity to the superordinate 
group, in addition, to representation, could help explain when subgroups or individuals do (not) 
follow larger group norms. 
 The poll information used in the current research did not include an explicit outgroup. I 
expected low-status subgroup members would see the superordinate group as less central to their 
identity than high-status subgroup members, but all participants belonged to the superordinate 
group (American). It is unclear if subgroups would have differed to the same magnitude in 
following norms between a superordinate ingroup (e.g., Americans) compared to an outgroup 




following an outgroup versus superordinate group norm, this may still provide support for the 
central hypotheses—that superordinate group norms are less influential in shaping low-status 
than high-status subgroup members’ attitudes—by providing a comparison source of influence. 
Perceived Fairness of Underrepresentation 
While low-status subgroup members saw themselves as less represented in the national 
polls than did high-status subgroups, this did not translate to differences in national 
identification. Of the 104 tested correlations between perceived representation and 
national/racial/gender identification, only nine were statistically significant (~8.7%, p = .964) 
and were relatively small correlations (rs < .32). This suggests that representation and 
identification are viewed distinctly by participants. Though one’s group may not be central in the 
representation of the superordinate group, this did not affect the centrality of the superordinate 
group to one’s identity across subgroups. Seeing one’s group as underrepresented did not lead 
participants to distance themselves from the larger group and distance from the larger group did 
not affect perceived representation. Hornsey and colleagues (2003) similarly found group power 
(operationalized as group representation in a superordinate group council) did not change group 
identification, though Hornsey and colleagues only measured identification with an immediate 
group and not a superordinate group. When power, or representation is seen as unjust, people 
tend to distrust the outgroup more (Hornsey et al., 2003). Participants may have perceived 
underrepresentation as fair and reflective of true differences in the population. Even in Study 3, 
when I manipulated numerical group representation, I kept representation fairly similar (68% 
versus 32%), to ensure study information was believable. Participants may not have perceived 
the distribution as unjust although the manipulation affected perceived representation as 




the poll as trustworthy and less informative in shaping attitudes (Hornsey et al., 2003). Future 
work should ask about perceived legitimacy or maximize the underrepresentation of groups to 
examine the effects of legitimacy on identification and adherence to superordinate group norms.  
Subgroup status. Results do not support my expectations that subgroup status would 
affect bandwagoning. I expected, because high-status groups have greater control in shaping the 
superordinate group (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), they would see themselves as 
more similar to the superordinate group and would follow the group norms as a result. Low-
status group and high-status groups tended to bandwagon equally and in Study 1, high-status 
subgroup members bandwagoned less than low-status subgroup members.  
The groups used in the current research were naturally occurring groups based on 
national identification, gender and race. Results were mixed across studies as to whether a low-
status group adhered to superordinate group norms more, less, or equivalent to a high-status 
group. Future studies could further test the role of status and group interest by randomly 
assigning participants to subgroups of varying status levels and randomly assigning poll issues 
relevant only to randomly assigned groups (e.g., rules for a lab game).  
Subgroup Asymmetry Hypothesis  
The current research does not support the idea that the subgroup asymmetry hypothesis 
extends to affect adherence to superordinate group norms. Counter to the subgroup asymmetry 
hypotheses (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1997; Staerklé et al., 2010), participants did not differ in 
national identification by race or gender. Expected differences in national identification may not 
have emerged because of differences in how national identification was assessed. For example, 
Van Berkel and colleagues (2016) found men and women did not differ in national identification, 




& Feshbach, 1989).3 Participants may have identified with the nation to similar degrees, but 
identification expression may differ by group status. Historically oppressed group tend to express 
less glorification of the nation (Staerklé et al., 2010) and attachment to the nation generally 
(Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Results are fairly consistent with Horney and Hogg’s (2002) research 
on subgroup relations within superordinate groups—low-status subgroups did not resist 
categorization at the superordinate group level and high-status subgroup members were actually 
more protective of their subgroup identity as distinct within the superordinate group. 
 In accordance with the subgroup asymmetry hypothesis, minority subgroup members had 
lower correlations between racial/gender and national identification (r median = .59) than did 
majority subgroup members (r median = .80). This suggests, racial and gender identification are 
more closely tied to national identity for high-status subgroups than low-status subgroups, 
although low-status and high-status groups did not differ overall in identification,. 
Conflicting Norms 
 The current research examined whether subgroups implicitly conflict with the 
superordinate group—whether they see the larger group norms and interests as separate. Results 
largely did not support the idea that there was implicit conflict—subgroup members did not 
follow superordinate group norms differently depending on group status, unless the issue was 
particularly subgroup relevant. No participants in the current studies had information about the 
attitudes of their subgroup. Participants in Study 3 only had information about their subgroup 
representation—not their subgroup’s average opinion. Future research should examine explicit 
conflicts between the superordinate group and the subgroup.  
People may follow the group with which they most identify because people follow the 
                                                 
3 Staerklé and colleagues (2010), however, found a greater magnitude of difference between majorities and 




group they are most similar with (e.g., Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry et al., 1999). Information 
about subgroup attitudes within a superordinate group attitude (subgroup and superordinate 
group categorizations are simultaneously salient) can cause greater identification with a 
subgroup and greater dislike of dissimilar suboutgroups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b). People may 
be more likely to follow the norms of their subgroup over the superordinate group to increase 
positive differences between the subgroups (Brewer, 1991; Hornsey & Hogg, 1999). Low-status 
subgroup members may be actually less resistant to superordinate group categorization compared 
to high-status subgroup members because the superordinate group allows low-status subgroup 
members to avoid negative self-concept and enhance positive self-concept (Hornsey & Hogg, 
2002). If low-status subgroup members are more motivated to identify at the superordinate group 
level, they may follow a superordinate group norm more than a subgroup norm. 
Implications for Behavior 
 The current studies show people’s judgements are influenced by the larger group. It is 
unclear from the current studies how voting behavior would be influenced. For voting behavior 
to occur, one must decide to vote and then how to vote. According to the theory of reasoned 
action (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), intention to engage in a behavior is a function of one’s 
attitude toward the behavior and the subjective norm, or belief about whether important others 
think one should engage in the behavior. The subjective norms primed through polls in these 
studies show the direction of attitudes about a particular issue, but do not indicate whether other 
important group members intend to vote on the issue, or vote for representatives that support the 
issue. Superordinate group norms about a behavior will likely not differ by subgroup 
membership, but will influence people in similar ways, depending on relevance of the behavioral 




superordinate group norms need to work together—the norm to engage in voting behavior and 
the norm to support a particular issue when engaging in voting.  
However, hearing a majority has acted on attitudes and voted accordingly may actually 
discourage an individual from engaging in voting behavior. People are less likely to vote when 
they hear early election results (Jackson, 1983). The utility of the behavior decreases because an 
outcome has already been decided, especially if one has negative attitudes towards voting or 
toward the many behavioral steps required to vote (e.g., registering, waiting in line, etc.). 
Similarly, people behave opposite a social norm when they believe their behavior surpasses a 
group standard, unless they are also given injunctive normative information (Schultz et al., 
2007). Thus for a superordinate group attitudinal norm to translate into behavior, it is important 
for norms to exist at the level of attitudes and behaviors, and with both injunctive and descriptive 
norms about the approval and importance of the behavior.  
Conclusion 
 Subgroup members did not reliably differ in adherence to superordinate group norms, in 
the context of American national identity. Study 3 provided evidence that subgroups may not 
bandwagon when an issue is particularly relevant to their subgroup interest, but this requires 
replication with clearer manipulations of relevance. Although perceived subgroup representation 
depended on group status and sample characteristics in manipulations, differences in 
identification with the superordinate group did not emerge as expected. Although the current 
studies did not show consistent differences in adherence to superordinate group norms based in 
subgroup representation and status, consistent bandwagon effects emerged and the studies 
suggest differences may emerge from a group’s interest in the issue. Results of this work require 




adherence to superordinate group norms when superordinate and subgroup interests explicitly 
conflict. Greater understanding of the dynamics between superordinate groups and subgroups 
can help target normative interventions to reach the intended population and can facilitate 
understanding how poll affect voters intentions and behaviors—whether or not polls are 
problematic to the democratic process and whether they are problematic for some Americans 
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Table 8.  
Correlations in Study 2A, within race 
Condition  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
White 
Americans 
1. Poll Condition (1 = Pro; 2 = 
Con) 
–            
2. Oppose Increasing SS Age .25 –           
 3. Opinion of SS -.13    .04 –          
 4. Represent White Americans .12  -.19 .07 –         
 5. Represent Black Americans .23   .04 .21 .15** –        
 6.Represent Latino/a Americans .14   .00 .14 .43** .94*** –       
 7. Represent Asian Americans .16   .08 .16 .43** .92*** .91*** –      
 8. American Identification -.07  -.11 .08 -.04 .00 .07 -.05 –     
 9. Racial Identification -.05  -.10 .08 .07 .00 .05 -.03 .84*** –    
 10. Prior Knowledge .06   .01 -.09 -.16 -.11 -.11 -.12 -.23 -.35* –   
 11. Perceived Poll Influence .17  -.06 -.09 .03 -.08 -.06 .03 .22 .29* .00 –  
 12. Willing to Share Opinion -.02  -.24 .34* .15 .01 .00 -.08 .29* .29* -.11 .08 – 
 13. Bandwagoning .09  -.14 -.07 .20 .10 .07 .17 .04 -.04 .17 .39** .08 
Black 
Americans 
1. Poll Condition –             
2. Oppose Increasing SS Age .08 –           
 3. Opinion of SS -.17 -.03 –          
 4. Represent White Americans -.05 .03 .03 –         
 5. Represent Black Americans .17 -.21 .23 .18 –        
 6.Represent Latino/a Americans .12 .00 .27* .29* .74*** –       
 7. Represent Asian Americans -.01 -.04 .23 .29* .66*** .86*** –      
 8. American Identification -.07 .03 .18 .12 .23 .10 .19 –     
 9. Racial Identification -.14 .35** .30* .03 .25 .21 .26 .45** –    
 10. Prior Knowledge .06 .26* -.33* -.17 -.43** -.35** -.26* -.11 -.10 –   
 11. Perceived Poll Influence .21 -.07 .21 .03 .25 .23 .19 .09 .15 -.05 –  
 12. Willing to Share Opinion -.15 .00 .22 .18 .05 .10 .04 .08 .20 -.25 -.12 – 
 13. Bandwagoning .13 .06 .22 .02 .24 .26 .15 .06 .23 -.23 .11 .38** 
Latino/a 
Americans 
1. Poll Condition –             
2. Oppose Increasing SS Age .28* –           
 3. Opinion of SS .17 .20 –          
 4. Represent White Americans -.16 .23 .04 –         
 5. Represent Black Americans .46*** .16 .08 .17 –        
 6.Represent Latino/a Americans .41** .27* .10 .11 .77*** –       
 7. Represent Asian Americans .21 .10 -.05 .18 .62*** .78*** –      
 8. American Identification .35** -.08 .04 -.07 .16 .15 .00 –     
 9. Racial Identification .40** .11 .07 .09 .09 .13 .11 .66*** –    
 10. Prior Knowledge -.22 .07 .20 .07 -.03 -.09 -.25 -.31* .40** –   
 11. Perceived Poll Influence .14 -.06 -.06 .19 .18 .23 .30* .02 .09 .03 –  
 12. Willing to Share Opinion .15 .10 .27* -.09 -.09 .16 .08 .13 .28* -.27* -.14 – 
 13. Bandwagoning .18 .18 .11 .08 .08 .23 .29* .22 .26 -.20 .27* .10 
Asian 
Americans 
1. Poll Condition –             
2. Oppose Increasing SS Age .54*** –           
 3. Opinion of SS -.11 -.06 –          
 4. Represent White Americans -.04 .18 .10 –         
 5. Represent Black Americans .25 .24 -.03 .42** –        
 6. Represet Latino/a Americans .23 .35** .00 .38** .84*** –       
 7. Represent Asian Americans .19 .34** .07 .16 .54*** .67*** –      
 8. American Identification -.11 -.01 -.15 .19 .20 .23 .25 –     
 9. Racial Identification -.18 -.04 .11 .25 .08 .02 -.01 .62*** –    
 10. Prior Knowledge .36** .14 -.25 .04 -.04 -.07 -.05 .03 -.02 –   
 11. Perceived Poll Influence -.07 -.19 .24 .02 -.04 -.03 -.08 -.17 .06 -.04 –  
 12. Willing to Share Opinion -.05 .01 .19 .00 -.17 -.08 .01 .21 .25 -.07 .03 – 
 13. Bandwagoning -.23 -.24 .41** .09 .14 .13 .19 .05 .24 -.05 .10 .13 
Note: Pro = Majority Support Increasing SS Age; Con = Majority Oppose Increasing SS Age; •p < .10,*p < .05, 
















Table 12.  
Correlations in Study 2B, within race 
 
Note: Pro = Majority Support Free Trade; Con = Majority Oppose Free Trade; •p < .10,*p < 
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
  
Condition  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
White 
Americans 
1. Poll Condition (1 = Pro; 2 = 
Con) 
–            
2. Opposing Free Trade in NA .36** –           
3. Opinion of Free Trade -.34* -.93*** –          
 4. Represent White Americans .02 -.25 .26 –         
 5. Represent Black Americans .03 -.14 .10 .73*** –        
 6. Represent Latino/a Americans -.01 -.08 .07 .68*** .89*** –       
 7. Represent Asian Americans -.02 -.09 .04 .64*** .87*** .83*** –      
 8. American Identification -.01  .15 -.14 -.07 .11 .17 .12 –     
 9. Racial Identification .02  .12 -.13 .02 .12 .16 .09 .85*** –    
 10. Prior Knowledge .02 -.22 .31* -.01 -.14 -.16 -.17 -.05 -.05 –   
 11. Perceived Poll Influence -.10 -.28* .31* -.04 -.05 -.08 -.01 .03 .11 .57*** –  
 12. Willing to Share Opinion -.04 -.14 .13 .10 .11 .13 .04 -.02 -.02 -.08 -.13 – 
 13. Bandwagoning -.06 -.18 .12 -.18 -.10 -.11 -.08 -.07 -.07 .08 .09 -.10 
Black 
Americans 
1. Poll Condition –            
2. Opposing Free Trade in NA .43** –           
3. Opinion of Free Trade -.38** -.81*** –          
 4. Represent White Americans .04 -.10 -.02 –         
 5. Represent Black Americans -.09 -.02 .08 .53*** –        
 6. Represent Latino/a Americans -.26* -.13 .18 .32* .75*** –       
 7. Represent Asian Americans -.23 -.06 .12 .41** .85*** .86*** –      
 8. American Identification .01 -.16 .31* .07 .29* .25 .24 –     
 9. Racial Identification -.05 .01 .06 .07 .25 .17 .28* .51*** –    
 10. Prior Knowledge .25 .14 -.11 -.15 -.18 -.04 -.06 .02 -.05 –   
 11. Perceived Poll Influence .05 .07 -.12 -.06 .15 .09 .12 .17 .16 -.17 –  
 12. Willing to Share Opinion .01 -.29* .23 .14 .07 .10 .05 .07 .16 -.07 -.13 – 
 13. Bandwagoning -.04 -.14 .10 -.24 -.15 -.10 -.06 -.08 -.11  .06 .13 -.06 
Latino/a 
Americans 
1. Poll Condition –            
2. Opposing Free Trade in NA .44** –           
3. Opinion of Free Trade -.40** -.92*** –          
 4. Represent White Americans .02 .07 -.06 –         
 5. Represent Black Americans -.02 -.01 .06 .29* –        
 6. Represent Latino/a Americans -.04 -.04 .08 .33* .69*** –       
 7. Represent Asian Americans .04 -.05 .09 .33* .59*** .87*** –      
 8. American Identification .13 -.06 .08 .02 .14 .12 .08 –     
 9. Racial Identification .17 -.08 .14 .24 .11 .16 .14 .69*** –    
 10. Prior Knowledge .03 -.22 .11 -.03 -.09 -.02 .04 -.26* -.30* –   
 11. Perceived Poll Influence .03 .15 -.06 -.02 .22 .30* .24 .01 -.03 -.11 –  
 12. Willing to Share Opinion .16 -.09 .15 .09 -.16 -.08 -.02 .25 .34** -.45*** -.12 – 
 13. Bandwagoning .45*** .12 -.12 .00 -.06 .11 .19 .14 .14 .02 -.07 .07 
Asian 
Americans 
1. Poll Condition –            
2. Opposing Free Trade in NA .17 –           
3. Opinion of Free Trade -.14 -.90*** –          
 4. Represent White Americans .05 .00 -.02 –         
 5. Represent Black Americans .09 .17 -.14 .52*** –        
 6. Represent Latino/a Americans .18 -.02 .02 .42** .81*** –       
 7. Represent Asian Americans .12 -.01 .02 .33* .60*** .78*** –      
 8. American Identification -.18 .13 -.04 .00 .08 .17 .26 –     
 9. Racial Identification -.13 -.04 .13 -.03 .02 -.06 -.02 .60*** –    
 10. Prior Knowledge .13 -.01 -.04 .03 .05 .11 .00 -.17 -.28* –   
 11. Perceived Poll Influence -.23 .02 .07 .02 .20 .29* .20 -.07 -.15 .15 –  
 12. Willing to Share Opinion -.09 -.19 .29* -.04 -.05 -.04 -.04 .19 .27* -.55*** -.11 – 
























































































































Majority Supports Unlocking the iPhone




























































































































































































































































































Manipulations Study 1 
Instructions:  As part of this study, we’re interested in how people understand information from 
polls. Please take a minute to examine the following poll result. You’ll be asked about the poll 
later. 
 
The latest national survey by Pew Research Center asked 1,002 American adults their 
response to the following question: 
 





























Questions for Study 1 
 
According to the poll you just read, which position do most Americans support? 
 Should not unlock iPhone 
 Should unlock iPhone 
 Don’t know 
 
Which position do you support? 
  




    
 






When did you decide your stance on this issue? 
 Just now 
 In the last 3 days 
 In the last week 
 In the last month 
 Before that 
 
What is your opinion of: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Mostly 
Unfavorable 
    
 





 The Department of Justice 
 
Some cellphones are called “smartphones” because of certain features they have. Is your 
cellphone a smartphone such as an iPhone, Android, Blackberry or Windows phone? 
 Yes, I have an iPhone 
 Yes, I have a smartphone other than an iPhone 
 No, I have a cellphone that is not a smartphone 
 No, I do not have a cellphone 
 
How much if anything, have you heard about a federal court ordering Apple to help the FBI 
unlock an iPhone used by one of the suspects in the San Bernardino terrorist attacks? Have you 
heard: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
A lot     
 
    
 









How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all     
 





To what extent is the poll a good representation of: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Representative 
    
 




 White Americans 
 Black Americans 
 Asian Americas 






Manipulations Study 2A 
Instructions:  As part of this study, we’re interested in how people understand information from 
polls. Please take a minute to examine the following poll result. You’ll be asked about the poll 
later. 
 
The latest national poll by Gallup asked 1,002 American adults their response to the following 
question: 
 
Assuming there would be no change in Social Security benefits for those who are now age 55 or 
older, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea to increase the age at which people are 
























Study 2A Questions 
 
According to the poll you just read, which position do most Americans support? 
 Increase the eligibility age for full social security benefits 
 Do not increase the eligibility age for full social security benefits 
 Don’t know 
 
Which position do you support? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
Increase the eligibility 
age for full social 
security benefits 
    
 
    
 
Do not increase the 
eligibility age for full 
social security benefits 
  
When did you decide your stance on this issue? 
 Just now 
 In the last 3 days 
 In the last week 
 In the last month 
 Before that 
 
What is your opinion of the Social Security System? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Mostly 
Unfavorable 
    
 





How much if anything, have you heard about increasing the eligibility age for full social security 
benefits? Have you heard: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
A lot     
 
    
 
 Nothing at 
all 
 
How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all     
 





To what extent is the poll a good representation of: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Representative 
    
 




 White Americans 
 Black Americans 
 Asian Americas 






Manipulations Study 2B 
Instructions:  As part of this study, we’re interested in how people understand information from 
polls. Please take a minute to examine the following poll result. You’ll be asked about the poll 
later. 
 
The PEW Research Center asked 2,001 American adults their response to the following question: 
 
In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries in 


























Study 2B Questions 
According the poll you just read, what do most Americans think of free trade agreements 
between the U.S. and other countries in North America? 
 They are a good thing 
 They are a bad thing 
 No opinion 
 
Which position do you support? 
In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries in North 
America are a good thing or a bad thing for the United States? 
  
When did you decide your stance on this issue? 
 Just now 
 In the last 3 days 
 In the last week 
 In the last month 
 Before that 
 
What is your opinion of free trade? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Mostly 
Unfavorable 
    
 





How much if anything, have you heard about free trade agreements between the U.S. and other 
countries in North America? Have you heard: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
A lot     
 
    
 
 Nothing at 
all 
 
How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all     
 





To what extent is this PEW poll a good representation of: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Representative 
    
 




 White Americans 
 Black Americans 
 Asian Americas 
 Latino/a Americans  
1 2 3 4 5  6 





Manipulations Study 3 
Instructions:  As part of this study, we’re interested in how people understand information from 
polls. Please take a minute to examine the following poll result, presented as both a table and a 
graph. You’ll be asked about the poll later. 
 
The latest national poll by Gallup asked 1,002 American adults their response to the following 
question: 
 
A grocery store has offered you a free loyalty card that will save you money on your purchases. 
In exchange, the store will keep track of your shopping habits and sell this data to third parties. 
 
Would this scenario be acceptable to you or not? 
 
[Condition 1]: Majority Women; Majority Unacceptable 
  Sample Characteristics 
  Women  68% 







[Condition 2]: Majority Women; Majority Acceptable 
  
 Sample Characteristics 
  Women  68% 











[Condition 3]: Minority Women; Majority Unacceptable 
  
 Sample Characteristics 
  Women  32% 









[Condition 4]: Minority Women; Majority Acceptable 
  
 Sample Characteristics 
  Women  32% 











[Condition 5]: Majority Women; Majority Current Laws 
  
 Sample Characteristics 
  Women  68% 









[Condition 6]: Majority Women; Majority Enact more Laws 
  
 Sample Characteristics 
  Women  68% 










[Condition 7]: Minority Women; Majority Current Laws 
  
 Sample Characteristics 
  Women  32% 









[Condition 8]: Minority Women; Majority Enact more Laws 
  
 Sample Characteristics 
  Women  32% 











Study 3 Issue Questions 
According the poll you just read, which position do most people support? 
 Unacceptable 
 Acceptable 
 No opinion 
 
Which position do you support? 
  
When did you decide your stance on this issue? 
 Just now 
 In the last 3 days 
 In the last week 
 In the last month 
 Before that 
 
How much have you heard about this issue? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Nothing at 
all 
    
 
    
 
 A lot 
 
How important is this issue to you? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Important 
    
 





How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all     
 





To what extent does this Gallup poll a good representation of: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Representative 
    
 







How important is this issue to: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Important 
    
 





 Women  
1 2 3 4 5  6 




According the poll you just read, which position do most people support? 
 Current laws are about right 
 Enact more laws 
 No opinion 
 
Which position do you support? 
  
When did you decide your stance on this issue? 
 Just now 
 In the last 3 days 
 In the last week 
 In the last month 
 Before that 
 
How much have you heard about this issue? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Nothing at 
all 
    
 
    
 
 A lot 
 
How important is this issue to you? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Important 
    
 





How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all     
 





To what extent does this Gallup poll a good representation of: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Representative 
    
 







How important is this issue to: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Not at all 
Important 
    
 





 Women   
1 2 3 4 5  6 
Current laws are 
about right 







Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the 
scale provided.  
 
American identification: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
    
 




____1. I am glad to be American 
____2. I think that Americans have a lot to be proud of.  
____3. The fact that I am an American is an important part of my identity. 
 
Racial identification: 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
    
 




____1. I am glad to be a White/Black/Latino(a)/Asian American 
____2. I think that White/Black/Latino(a)/Asian Americans have a lot to be proud of.  




1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
    
 




____1. I am glad to be male/female 
____2. I think that males/females have a lot to be proud of.  








I am (circle one):  Male / Female     
 
I am ______ years old  
 
Please check which group you consider yourself to be a member of: 
White   
African American/Black    
Hispanic   
Asian/Pacific Islander   
        Native American    
Multi-racial (please specify)____________________ 
Other (please specify)_________________ 
 
I consider myself: 
Moderate 




Republican     0    1     2     3    4     5     6     7     8     9     Democrat 
 
[M-turk Questions Only] 
 








In what state do you currently live? (If not in the U.S. please leave blank) 
 
What is your household’s average yearly income level? 
 
Below 
$25,000 
$25,000-
$50,000 
$50,000-
$100,000 
$100,000-
$200,000 
$200,000 
and above 
 
 
 
